RobinZ comments on Why the beliefs/values dichotomy? - Less Wrong

20 Post author: Wei_Dai 20 October 2009 04:35PM

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Comment author: RobinZ 21 October 2009 02:48:00PM 0 points [-]

If the agent already has a penny (which they must if they can afford to choose the third box), they could just flip the penny to decide which of the first two boxes to take and save themselves the money.

Unless you're being a devil's advocate, I don't see any reason to justify a completely rational agent choosing the random box.

Comment author: timtyler 21 October 2009 03:19:26PM *  0 points [-]

What - never? Say they can only make the choice once - and their answer determines which box they will get on all future occasions.

Comment author: pengvado 21 October 2009 04:01:56PM *  0 points [-]

Then choice C isn't a random mixture of choice A and choice B.

Preferring that there be randomness at a point where you otherwise wouldn't get a decision at all, is fine. What doesn't happen is preferring one coin-flip in place of one decision.

Comment author: RobinZ 21 October 2009 03:26:54PM *  0 points [-]

Not to be crass, but given the assumption that Wei_Dai is not saying something utterly asinine, does your interpretation of the hypothetical actually follow?

Comment author: timtyler 21 October 2009 03:36:49PM *  0 points [-]

Hang on! My last comment was a reply to your question about when it could be rational to select the third box. I have already said that the original example was unclear. It certainly didn't suggest an infinite sequence - and I wasn't trying to suggest that.

The example specified that choosing the third box was the correct answer - under the author's own proposed decision theory. Surely interpretations of what it was supposed to mean should bear that in mind.

Comment author: RobinZ 21 October 2009 04:37:46PM *  0 points [-]

I don't believe we're actually arguing about anything worth caring about. My understanding was that Wei_Dai was illustrating a problem with UDT1 - in which case a single scenario in which UDT1 gives an unambiguously wrong answer suffices. To disprove Wei_Dai's assertion requires demonstrating that no scenario of the kind proposed makes UDT1 give the wrong answer, not showing that not every scenario of the kind proposed makes UDT1 give the wrong answer.

Comment author: timtyler 21 October 2009 06:45:54PM *  1 point [-]

Are you sure you are taking the fact that he is UDT's inventor and biggest fan into account? He certainly didn't claim that he was illustrating a problem with UDT.

Comment author: RobinZ 21 October 2009 08:24:48PM 1 point [-]

...you're right, I'm misreading. I'll shut up now.