Rationality Quotes: October 2009
A monthly thread for posting rationality-related quotes you've seen recently (or had stored in your quotesfile for ages).
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then fine, post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB.
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
Loading…
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Comments (276)
-- Aretae
I wasn't especially impressed by Aretae's reasoning. For example,
You will not be able to perform this updating unless you have already assigned prior probabilities to propositions connecting the past to the future. That's why Bayesian updating will never get it right if you start out with the anti-induction prior. Hence, to address Hume's problem, you have to come up with a justification for preferring certain prior distributions. We may have good reasons for preferring those distributions that posit that the past is like the future, but, contra Aretae, those reasons are outside the scope of mere Bayesian updating.
ETA: Better link on anti-induction.
Well that's why I quoted one part and not the other.
I had trouble understanding the quote out of context. The first sentence is fine. But, despite a prior understanding of Hume's argument, I couldn't see how Aretae got from the first sentence to the conclusion that "Hume's argument goes up in smoke". On the contrary, Hume's point was that the connections we make in our minds might have little similarity to the actual connections, if any, that exist among things in the external world.
I had to go to the context to see that Aretae is making Hume out to be some kind of a-priorist. Aretae concludes that general arguments against a-priorists are therefore arguments against Hume. This is a bizarre misreading of Hume. Hume's problem of induction is itself an attack on a-priorism. He refers to a-priori arguments only to show that they do not suffice to justify induction. This was big news in a day when practically all intellectuals were a-priorists.
Yes, a good point. There's the famous argument that naturalism is self-defeating because e.g., "why should I trust a monkey brain?" But in order to get to where you are today, each organism in your ancestry must have had enough harmony with nature's laws so as to harness them for its sustenance and reproduction.
So there has to be some connection between the two.
What else are you going to trust more? (Remember whatever you trust, and your trusting itself, depends on a "monkey brain".)
-- Hybrid Theory
-- Kyon, The Melancholy of Suzumiya Haruhi
Wow! He's been able to identify every flying object he's ever seen? Must be a boring fellow when stargazing!
I think he means he's never seen an alien spaceship...
Thank you.
I'm not sure stars can be called "flying objects".
Well, you can't quite know if a skyward light is something flying near earth until you've identified it, can you? :-)
Mmm. You can usually tell that something's a celestial object, and thus not a flying object, without being able to classify it further...
You've identified it in the relevant sense for the purposes for which the UFO classification was created.
Yikes, too much nesting!
The Air Force (or whatever) invented the classification UFO for an object they don't yet know how to respond to because of the current inability to identify it. Knowing that something is a far-off celestial object is sufficient identification in this context, making it no longer a UFO. [/pedant]
Bumper sticker: "UFOs are real; the Air Force doesn't exist!"
ETA: wait, that contradicts my original point. You know, just forget this last comment. Stars count as flying. They travel without touching a planet's ground. Deal with it. ;-)
Speaking of Haruhi, should I consume it in animated or text form? (If animated, what order?)
This may be the only Japanese work of which I honestly couldn't say, but on the whole, I'd guess animated first.
First? Are you implying that I should go through both ultimately? If yes, why?
I'd second Eliezer. You must start with animated, and watch it in Haruhi order. There is a very good reason that Kyoani broadcast it that way, and it improves on the novels in other respects.
(I withhold any assessment of season 2, however, because of Endless Eight; you may choose as you will whether to watch the anime or just read the Baka Tsuki fan translations.)
Because of Endless Eight? What about them?
My original intention was to wait for the pirates to finish plundering the 2009 version and watch that.
Some people are insulted enough by them they prefer to not watch season 2 at all.
Adaptation decay? Discontinuity? Ah, yes, there it is (scroll to bottom)! Thanks for the heads up.
So, in Haruhi, does Egan's law apply? Does it all add up to normality? :)
Are you aware of the anthropic principle?
Yes; don't see how it applies.
It's another quote. No, Haruhi's world does not add up to normality.
Well of course not, you read far too many books for that to still work!
-- Joshua Greene, The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It
Too bad the same thesis also makes poor inferences from poorly-designed studies of human moral reasoning.
More to the point, stick to the right facts, ask the right questions and use subtly judgemental language in a way that avoids the rudimentary defences against manipulation that most adults have.
-- Matt Arnold
I would have been able to read that sentence correctly without context if it had a comma: "allowed to fail, to teach them a lesson."
Nothing sucks more than that moment during an argument when you realize you're wrong.
-- Unknown
Hm, what about being constipated with hemorrhoids?
ETA: No wait, how about this: same as above, but, assuming you're a male, with the intestines so full that they press against the prostate (basically the "core" of your pleasure/pain generator) and keep you from being able to urinate.
Then, top it off with a severe hangover headache.
Who would prefer being proven wrong to all of that? Me.
Yup, that's way worse.
... TMI?
Hey, just suggesting a hypothetical...
There really are worse things in life than realizing you're wrong mid-argument.
That's a terrible quote. Being wrong is the best possible outcome of an argument, as it's the one with the highest expected knowledge gain (unless you're a hardcore altruist who doesn't value their own knowledge differently from anyone else's).
Does anyone know the origin of this notion (that being wrong is the best outcome of an argument?). It strikes me as basically a founding principle of rationality and I'd like to know the earliest public reference to/ discussion of it. Alternately, is this sentiment summarized in any good quotes? It is hugely important for Hegel but he isn't, you know, pithy.
In information theory, there's the concept of the surprisal, which is the logarithm of the inverse of the expected probability of an event. The lower the probability, the higher the surprise(al). The higher the surprisal, the greater the information content.
(Intuitively, the less likely something is, the more you change your beliefs upon learning it.)
So, yeah, it's pretty enshrined in information theory. Entropy is equivalent to the (oxymoronic) "expected surprisal". That is, given a discrete probability distribution over events, the probability-weighted average surprisal is the entropy.
Incidentally, as part of a project to convert all of the laws of physics into information-theoretic form, I realized that the elastic energy of a deformable body tells you its probability of being in that state, and (by the above argument), it's information content. That means you can explain failure modes in terms of the component being forced to store more information than it's capable of.
Well, it's interesting to me.
You seem like as good a person to ask this as any: Is there a good introduction to information theory out there? How would one start digging into the field?
To be quite honest, I only really started to study it after reading Eliezer Yudkowsky's Engines of Cognition, which connected it to what I know about thermodynamics. ( Two blog posts inspired by it.) So, like you, I'm an autodidact on the topic.
Most people would recommend David MacKay's downloadable book, which is written in a friendly, accessible tone. That helped a lot, but I also found it hard to follow at times. That may be due to not having a physical copy though. And it can't be beat as a technical reference or in terms of depth.
Personally, my path to learning about it was to basically read the Wikipedia articles on Information Theory and Kullback-Leibler divergence, and every relevant, interesting link that branches off from those (on or off wikipedia).
ETA: Oh, and learning about statistical mechanics, especially the canonical ensemble was a big help for me too, esp. given the relation to the E. T. Jaynes articles on the maximum entropy formalism. But YMMV.
This kind of sentiment pops up in Plato a lot, esp. in discussions of rhetoric, like here in Gorgias:
"For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good to be rid of the greatest evil from oneself than to rid someone else of it. I don't suppose that any evil for a man is as great as false belief about the things we're discussing right now." (458a, Zeyl Translation)
Excellent point. This concept goes squarely with much of Socrates' philosophy: the wise men knew nothing, and he knew nothing, but he knew it and they didn't, thus, he was the wisest man alive, as the oracle had said.
No, that's backwards. Learning that you are wrong is good if and only if you are wrong. But it's only good because you were already wrong, which was bad - you were making bad decisions before. It's like saying that it is better to win the lottery than to be born rich. Roughly speaking, it doesn't matter when or where the money or knowledge comes from, only that you can use it.
So if you are surprised to find a $20 bill in your couch, your disappointment at having lost $20 some time in the past is equal to your pleasure at now having $20 more than you did a moment ago?
My current level of ignorance is a fact of life, I already know that there must be things that I'm wrong about. How is finding out something in particular that I am wrong about anything but a positive outcome?
roughly, yes.
If your mistakes are independent, then correcting one of them doesn't (much) correct your estimate of how many more mistakes you have to correct. Say you have 21 beliefs with 95% confidence and an argument clarifies a random one of them. You still have 1 expected wrong belief. By independence, we might as well say it's belief #1 that gets clarified. People who were wrong about it end up the same as people who were right about it. Yes, they gained more information, but they were really just unlucky to start with less information. This is exactly the lottery/inheritance model.
Yes, your ignorance is a fact, but it's not a fact accessible to you. The argument decreases your estimate of your ignorance by the same amount, regardless of whether you win or lose. If you happen to know how ignorant you are, how many items you're wrong about, then the situation is different, but that's a lot less realistic than independence.
So if I understand the point you're making: Losing an argument provides enough evidence of your prior ignorance to prevent any net gain in your expectation of your own overall knowledgeability, at least relative to winning the argument.
I don't disagree, but I don't know why I'd care to base an emotional response on this kind of evaluation. I'm not fretting over my absolute position on the axis of knowledge, I'm just hill climbing. It's the first derivative that my decisions affect, not the initial constant.
That depends rather a lot on my dopamine levels and thought patterns. I gain much more pleasure from finding cash than I am disappointed at losing it. Hang on... Excuse me. Going for a walk around my house with my wallet open.
Careful... diminishing returns still apply ;)
It isn't that winning the lottery is better than being born rich, it's that winning the lottery is better than not winning the lottery. Even if you're already rich, winning the lottery is good. Presumably you weren't born right about everything, which means it's more useful to lose arguments than win them. After all, if you never lose an argument, what's more likely: that you are right about everything, that you're the best arguer ever, or that you simply don't argue things you're wrong about?
My first thought was b). What was the intended response?
Presumably, not (a). In both other cases you've managed to not notice you're wrong.
Or that you are right about everything that you believe in strongly enough to argue about.
In other words, avoid believing strongly in the absence of evidence. And don't argue where you don't have the facts on your side.
It's more so a terrible quote because it is unwise to have a significant emotional attitude towards finding out you're wrong, because this will tend to reinforce irrational defense mechanisms ("Let's agree to disagree!"). The purpose of argument is, I hope, to improve your understanding of the world, so even if you shouldn't be thrilled to find yourself wrong, you shouldn't be afraid of doing so.
Yes, it is unwise to have such emotional attitudes, but you don't get rid of them by saying that they are bad. Honestly acknowledging their existence, as in the original quote, is probably a better route to their elimination than an emotionless assertion that losing arguments is good. The quote, on its own, probably doesn't do much good, and perhaps does some harm, but I think it is probably a better step to accomplishing loqi's goal than his phrasing.
Possibly, but I certainly wasn't advocating an emotionless response. Fight fire with fire! If you realize you're feeling stupid for having been wrong instead of feeling excited to have learned something, go ahead and feel stupid for feeling stupid.
I think I understand the rationale behind the original quote: Being wrong feels awful, so you should try to be right as often as possible. But this emotional response also disincentivizes attempts to stick your neck out on behalf of your existing beliefs.
One might counter that a positive emotional response to being wrong provides an incentive for being wrong in the first place just so you can feel good about discarding your flawed beliefs in the future. This strikes me as a far less plausible mechanism than the above.
I agree that this is a dangerous use of the original quote, which I admitted can be put to both good and bad uses.
I probably shouldn't have invoked you and definitely shouldn't have used "emotionless."
I agree with you, but I don't think that makes it a terrible quote. I personally don't seem to be psychologically able to avoid that awful sinking feeling when I realise I'm wrong, and it does suck. But recognising that it sucks is an important part of allowing the sinking feeling to wash over you, not be personally offended by it, and realise that if you update on this piece of wrongness, you're slightly less likely to be wrong again next time. For me at least, if I just try to pretend the sinking feeling isn't happening, because "rationally" it shouldn't, it just means I'm pretending the wrongness itself isn't happening. And that's a bad idea.
OTOH, you could just compare the feeling of being proven wrong to the feeling of being constipated with hemorrhoids and not being able to urinate, and reckon that you're getting off pretty easy.
Emotions help anchor new knowledge. That horrible sinking feeling helps you to remember your screw up, so you don't do it again. I suspect people that keep making the same mistakes are those who try to hide their mistakes from themselves and avoid that feeling.
Taken from Ruminations?
Why is this being voted down? I'm pretty sure Nominull didn't post the quote in order to endorse it as a normative sentiment. There's an ick reaction so you hit "Vote down"? But that's not what decides whether a quote is a good thing to have read!
I didn't downvote, but I didn't upvote either. The trouble is that a moment's thought reveals a host of objections. If I understand correctly, rationality quotes ought to be good, useful cached thoughts; this is merely a useful observation.
(Edit: On further reflection, I've upvoted it. Points to eirenicon.)
Also, in general, the quote is accurate. While it is intellectually useful to be proven wrong, it is not really a pleasant feeling, because it's much nicer to have already been right. This is especially true if you are heavily invested in what you are wrong about, eg. a scientist who realizes his research was based on an erroneous premise will be happy to stop wasting time but will also feel pretty crappy about the time he's already wasted. It's not in our nature to be purely cerebral about such a devastating thing as being wrong can be.
No, the quote isn't accurate. There are lots more worse feelings than being wrong in an argument. If you can't think of one, start from here.
It's hyperbole, then.
Hyperbole that only seems clever to people who haven't experienced real pain. (Note: didn't mod down, because the follow-up discussion is interesting.)
It's excessive hyperbole, then. You would have preferred the quote went more like the following.
That works :-)
I'm curious as to how you define real pain then. I had shingles 9 years ago and an infection that went systemic a year ago that was even more painful, though thankfully only for a day.
Well, if you want to pick nits, a vacuum cleaner sucks more than realizing you're wrong in an argument.
That's not picking nits; that's switching out a metaphorical definition mid-discussion for a more literal one, a species of "moving the goalposts".
This is picking nits.
Well, I don't feel bad at all, so obviously you haven't won this argument yet. Unless I'm wrong, of course.
I have a pound of Sweet-n-Sour pork for you to eat, and some scratchy toilet paper that can correct that ...
This does much to explain the mechanism by which humans avoid realizing when they are wrong!
I think the only ick reaction here is from my examples of experiences that are much more painful than any epistemic event.
(Agree, and add that) It is often more frustrating when I realise I am not wrong, can reliably reverse engineer the other's thought process, know that they will jump back to this error whenever an even tangentially related topic is discussed and I must now choose between rapport and reason. The death cry of mutual respect.
What about the moment when you realize you've made a significant practical mistake?
-- Sagredo, "Two New Sciences" (1914 translation), Galileo Galilei
...I had no idea the art of rationality got that advanced that early!
Hey, Darwin predicted and explained punctuated equilibrium all the way back in The Origin of the Species. It's remarkable how often the old masters hit a target generations ahead of their time. Or rather, it would be if I didn't already know that human beings don't as a rule draw the full benefit from the evidence at hand - which implies a small variation in the accuracy of the extrapolation leads to startling insight.
(Not having read the Latin - chiefly thanks to not being fluent in the Latin - I can't swear it's a perfect translation, but I saw it in the book and had to quote it.)
Okay, I'm over my quota, but I really have to reproduce this from an ensuing discussion between myself and Michael Vassar, in which Michael Vassar commented that Galileo seemed to have accomplished his feats through character traits other than ultra-high-g:
What's the point of a quota if you're getting mostly upvotes?
Perhaps that is the point of the quota?
That would be diversity and restraint.
Perhaps (he clarifies) one of the points of the quota is to prevent people from scoring lots of easy karma points via rationality quotes, which are the easiest way to get karma.
...I am such a clod. Please adjust your votes accordingly.
-- Roger Parloff, senior editor, "More brazen than Madoff?", Fortune, 2009-03-31
-- George Bernard Shaw, writer, Nobel laureate (1856-1950)
Edit: The full citation is to his 1903 play Man and superman: a comedy and a philosophy, where the character John Tanner ("M.I.R.C., Member of the Idle Rich Class") says:
All that glitters is not gold
Unknown Origin
That is, indeed, the idiomatic form. But it should properly be "Not all that glitters is gold", because gold does, in fact, glitter, and therefore some things which glitter are indeed gold. And, of course, some are diamond.
Usually, sentences of the form "all that glitters is not gold" mean "not (all that glitters is gold)". "All is not lost" does not mean that nothing got any worse. While it may seem weird for "not" to semantically modify the entire sentence while it syntactically modifies only "gold", we do this all the time using other words: "we ate nothing" does not mean "we ate X" for X equal to "nothing"; it means "for all X, not (we ate X)". For fun, see Wikipedia.
To imitate a friend of mine, how dare you try to make English make more sense.
But surely "we ate X" can mean "X = {Y: We ate Y}", as in "we ate a set of fried chicken legs" -- and this would allow one to analyze "we ate nothing" to mean "we ate X" for X = emptyset.
Let "nothing" be the empty set, and say that "we ate X" means that X is the set of all things that we ate? How would that handle the sentence "No robot took off its hat"? My semantics say that that's equivalent to "for no robot X, (X took off X's hat)"; yours would say something like "(the set of no robots) took off (some value that isn't a set of hats)".
-- Edsger Dijkstra
On a similar note, from the same author:
—Edsger Dijkstra (EWD1036)
You want to learn from experience, but you want to learn from other people’s experience when you can.
Warren Buffett
-- Winston Churchill
Ian Stewart, Letters to a Young Mathematician
I don't know if I like this one. One ought to try some things, if for no other reason to learn which sources of information are reliable.
What's even worse is trying to get that message to happen.
I confess, in my early internet days, I thought I figured out how to trisect an angle, and sent a sketch of it to a random math prof in Canada, asking for a prompt reply.
And you know what? I didn't get one! Probably the most polite reply one could reasonably expect.
It's easy to trisect an angle. Just use a protractor. ;)
-- Michael Bishop, Epistemology and the psychology of human judgement
For the record, I'm not the Michael Bishop that so expressed this insightful point.
-- Nassim Taleb
How does one escape from biology? This seems more closely related to transhumanism than rationality.
How does one escape from his biases?
With the biologically-instantiated powers of one's reason, I expect.
I think that's what Taleb wanted to say.
By applying software patches that detect hardware faults and compensate or work around them.
For example
Mathematics is rational, not reasonable.
-- Terry Padden, in "Ultimately, in Physics the Rational shall become Reasonable!"
Hamlet Act 2, scene 2, 239–251
What's this supposed to mean, in context?
Fuller quote (lines 243-251):
It doesn't seem especially deep to me...
Awesome! I didn't know you could think away chronic pain!
Well, if you could show us some chronic pain in the absence of any thinking...
the quote refers to thinking it good or bad, not thinking simpliciter
Then it is saying nothing about 'thinking away' the chronic pain. Pick which interpretation: either it's that thinking in general precedes pain, or that it precedes any assessment of goodness; neither supports your dismissal. (It may help your attempted criticism to switch from Shakespeare's ambiguous old English to a similar statement from the Stoics or Epicureans.)
I don't have much choice in whether to consider pain good.
*Sigh*, do we have another candidate for experiencing real physical pain before these blithe dismissals?
I assume you do this every time you exercise. Again, good doesn't mean not-painful; a change in beliefs will flip some given from 'good' to 'bad'. A searing pain is bad if you have no reason to endure; it's good if you think the alternative is the gom jabbar. (Is this really so difficult or controversial a point?)
No, it's just that to shore up your position, you have to diminish the point of the quote into triviality.
You can consider the long term effects of the pain to be good. You can be trained to get a dopamine release during a certain kind of pain. You cannot deem the pain itself good. A belief that the pain is good does not change the pain, and only exists through self-deception.
And please burn every copy of Dune you have. ;-)
Pain is just pain; it's neither good nor bad. Good and bad are only judgments, which are thoughts, and as such are determined by one's mind & beliefs. I think this is a profound truth unappreciated by many, and by no means trivial.
Over my dry dessicated remains!
Pain is the raw "quale" of badness. You can deem some future goal to be good, and worth the pain, but you can't judge pain good, except in an abstract, meaningless sense, disconnected from any implications for your actions.
The non-masochist also said:
I don't know if you were joking, but masochists only enjoy a very narrow kind of pain. It's a misconception that masochists enjoy all, or even many kinds of pain.
You need to study your Mary Baker Eddy.
You can. Just think about the details of the pain rather than the pain itself. Rest your attention on what the pain draws your attention towards and the pain goes away.
Does this free up your attention for other things, or does the pain keep coming back?
-- Michael Bishop, 50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science
-- seen on Livejournal
The master mathematician sat in his private room and pushed the papers from him. His calculations were already finished. In a small white phial there still remained a little of the drug that had kept him awake and active for four long nights. Each day, serene, explicit, patient as ever, he had given his lecture to his students, and then had come back at once to this momentous calculation. His face was grave, a little drawn and hectic from his drugged activity. For some time he seemed lost in thought. Then he went to the window, and the blind went up with a click. Half way up the sky, over the clustering roofs, chimneys and steeples of the city, hung the star.
He looked at it as one might look into the eyes of a brave enemy. "You may kill me," he said after a silence. "But I can hold you--and all the universe for that matter--in the grip of this little brain. I would not change. Even now."
-- H.G. Wells, "The Star", 1897
"Now I'll never know if I was right."
-- final words of Adric, in Dr. Who, "Earthshock", on realizing that he's about to crash into the Earth
I think that might need some context - was his prediction that he would die on crashing or something?
The specifics of what he was doing aren't important. (He had been trying to break an encrypted password-equivalent to the flight control computer, and had just entered in what he believed to be the solution, when the computer was destroyed, leaving him facing certain death.)
I just like the idea that what upset him most about dying was that he wouldn't be able to finish the problem he was working on.
In fewer words: we can imagine things that cannot exist.
In even fewer words: we can imagine the illogical.
What a fun game: Impossibilities are imaginable.
I think he's saying something more limiting - we cannot tell if we imagine things that cannot exist.
or even as far as - we cannot tell if things cannot exist. :)
Friedrich Hayek, Individualism: True and False
Really wish Friedrich used more paragraphs and less commas.
I lean libertarian, and have long worn the "yay Hayek!" mantle, but, looking back... It seems like he's unfairly using a) poorly-grounded attempts at large-scale social planning, to justify b) a philosophical, universal belief in the superiority of self-organizing systems over designed ones (i.e. even in building a robot).
Eliezer Yudkowsky has previous criticized b) in the context of Rodney Brooks's preferred robotic architecture. In some contexts, a centrally-planned mechanism which is the product of conscious individual reason is a better way to go. The inferiority of planned economies is not due to the very general superiority of self-organization that Hayek is claiming here.
I've run across that argument a couple times, and my reply has been that all economies are planned. Some are planned by a small number of dumb humans with inadequate data, and others are planned by a very large number of dumb humans with more data, and the latter are called market economies.
The problem is in the size of the system, relative to human cognition. Using specialization and management can increase the size of the system we can manage, but not without limit. That is why a self-improving AI is a potential threat, it can increase the size of the system it can manage well beyond what we can understand. It is also why I don't think provably Friendly AI is possible (though I hope I am wrong about that) and that GAI will be developed incrementally from specialized AIs or from general but less than intelligent systems. Also it is what gives me some hope for intelligence amplification to keep up with GAIs, at least for a while; we don't need to start from scratch, just keep improving the size of systems we can manage.
Control and knowledge don't care about scale. One can learn stuff about whole galaxies by observing them. When you want to "manage" an AI, the complexity of your concern is restricted to the complexity of your wish.
Size in describing a system isn't about scale, it's the number of interacting components and the complexity of their interactions. And I don't understand what you mean in your second sentence, it doesn't make sense to me.
A galaxy also isn't "just" about scale: it does contain more stuff, more components (but how do you know that and what does it mean?). Second sentence: using a telescope to make precise observations.
Confucius
Robert Hamburger, REAL Ultimate Power, The Official Ninja Book
"My interest is in the future because I am going to spend the rest of my life there."
Charles F. Kettering
"Greetings, my friend. We are all interested in the future, for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives."
The Amazing Criswell
"Experience does not ever err, it is only your judgement that errs in promising itself results which are not caused by your experiments."
Leonardo Da Vinci
"A theory which cannot be mortally endangered cannot be alive."
W. A. H. Rushton, quoted in J.R. Platt, "Strong Inference", Science vol.146, n.3642, 1964.
"There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received."
-- Francis Bacon
Indeed. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence.
"Everything is open to questioning. That does not mean all answers are equally valid."
-- Kelvin Throop
Ph.D. comics no.1173
The script:
A grad student in humanities has been called before a hearing to justify his existence.
Student: "It's hard to explain monetarily, but how can you put a price tag on the human soul?"
Student: "The humanities help us appreciate beauty and grow as individuals."
Student: "What good are science and technology if we don't ask ourselves the question, what does it mean to be a human being?"
Chair: "So how's the answer coming along?"
Student: "Oh no, we just ask the question, not actually answer it."
... and those that do happen to answer the question are excommunicated for heresy.
(approximate, my translation)
-- Esa Lappi, my high school math teacher when showing us the proof of some theorem.
Er, if you believe in being blessed to begin with, it's clearly better than seeing.
Lies!
Blessed just gives you a +1 to attack while sight gives you 2 AC, half speed, -4 search, automatically failed spot checks and the 50% miss chance on every attack from total concealment!
"Thus Aristotle laid it down that a heavy object falls faster than a light one does. The important thing about this idea is not that he was wrong, but that it never occurred to Aristotle to check it." Albert Szent-Györgyi de Nagyrápolt, winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.
Just out of curiosity: do you know the origin of that quote? I've tried to find the citation before, but been unable.
A good point - but also note that, when Galileo argued against Artistotelian physics in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, he set forth instead the idea of the inertial reference frame - but Galileo also never felt the need to perform an experiment to verify that his shipboard "experiments" would work as he predicted. Both the wrong conclusion, and the right conclusion, were arrived at via thought-experiment. And when Einstein took the next step by proposing the special theory of relativity, that too was a thought-experiment with no validation.
In fact, one can go further, because Aristotle's conclusion was presumably arrived at in the first place through observation of everyday experience (indeed, it almost seems wrong to attribute it specifically to Aristotle since it is simply the "common sense" view of most of humanity, before and since). So here we arguably have an example of a thought experiment successfully refuting an empirically-derived hypothesis.
I checked Aristotle's 'On the Heavens' and 'Physics'. Nowhere could I find him saying that a heavy object falls faster than a light one. Aren't it the Aristotelian scholars who said that and who are to blame? Aristotle distinguished relative weight (our mass) and absolute weight (our mass density) and gives practical examples to check that denser objects move faster downwards in water than less dense objects, if the objects have the same shape.
"I can't see it, so you must be wrong."
my four-year-old
--F. A. Hayek, The Sensory Order (never terse)
I guess Hayek is to opaque here to be quotable?
It is opaque. If I'm reading it right, it's a functionalist argument against the concept of qualia, much as Dennett makes here.
More or less. It's about a half-step away from invoking occam's razor to finish the job.
There are two mistakes one can make along the road to truth…not going all the way, and not starting.
Buddha
Well, at least Buddha started. If he'd gone a bit further along that particular road he may have added:
The public have an insatiable curiosity to know everything. Except what is worth knowing. Journalism, conscious of this, and having tradesman-like habits, supplies their demands. -Oscar Wilde
-- Paul Graham
Upvoted because it echoes my attitude towards your and Eliezer's ideas on decision theory, except I don't keep quiet.
-- Leo Tolstoy, "Anna Karenina"
I think fatalism may be a key moral failing from which many others, such as carelessness and an indifference to the suffering of others, spring. Fatalism is more common, I think, than many others seem to believe. It does not need to be gloomy as the Slavic versions, think of the words to Que Sera, Sera; "whatever will be, will be".
Since all things related to akrasia and self motivation are relevant here:
"As a final incentive before giving up a difficult task, try to imagine it successfully accomplished by someone you violently dislike." -K. Zenios
-Carl von Clausewitz
-Theodore Cheney, Getting the Words Right
It does not matter how frequently something succeeds if failure is too costly to bear. —Nicholas Nassim Taleb
(i.e.: don't forget to put, in your utility functions, the damn appropriate weight of those highly-improbable-but-high-negative-impact tragedies!)
You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts. —Daniel Moyniham
That's what my government told me when I discovered the phone tap.
Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned. —Avicenna (980–1037 AD)
What gets us into trouble is not what we don't know. It's what we know for sure that just ain't so. —Mark Twain
Never underestimate the difficulty of changing false beliefs by facts. —Harvard economist Henry Rosovsky
And when one goeth through fire for his teaching--what doth that prove? Verily, it is more when one's teaching cometh out of one's own burning!
-Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist
I have met people who exaggerate the differences [between the morality of different cultures], because they have not distinguished between differences of morality and differences of belief about facts. For example, one man said to me, "Three hundred years ago people in England were putting witches to death. Was that what you call the Rule of Human Nature or Right Conduct?" But surely the reason we do not execute witches is that we do not believe there are such things. If we did-if we really thought that there were people going about who had sold themselves to the devil and received supernatural powers from him in return and were using these powers to kill their neighbours or drive them mad or bring bad weather, surely we would all agree that if anyone deserved the death penalty, then these filthy quislings did. There is no difference of moral principle here: the difference is simply about matter of fact. It may be a great advance in knowledge not to believe in witches: there is no moral advance in not executing them when you do not think they are there. You would not call a man humane for ceasing to set mousetraps if he did so because he believed there were no mice in the house.
-C.S. Lewis
The kind of epistemology that allows you to be that certain about something so false is immoral.
To wit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5cFKpjRnXE&feature=player_embedded
For bad weather? As in... 3^^^3 days of sleet is worse than 50 years of torture?
Well, bad enough weather in an agricultural society is murder.
"Although blinding with science can be used in any argument, many will recognize the special domain of this fallacy as the subjects which like to consider themselves as sciences, but are not.
Science deals with things from atoms to stars at a level where individual differences do not matter. The scientist talks of 'all' rolling bodies or whatever, and formulates general laws to test by experiment.
The trouble with human beings is that, unlike rolling bodies, the individual differences do matter. Often, again unlike rolling bodies, they want to do different things.
Although this might prevent us from being scientific about human beings, it does not stop us pretending to be so. What we do here is to add the word 'science' onto the study, giving us 'economic science', 'political science' and 'social science'. Then we dress them in that white coat of scientific language, and hope that no one will notice the difference."
-- Madsen Pirie, "How To Win Every Argument: The Use and Abuse of Logic"
— Robert G. Ingersoll
[This is not a quote, but a meta discussion.]
I find it curious that the quotes posted here have higher votes on average than the usual discussion comments, and it makes me think that I have a below-average appreciation for quotations. Why do people value them, I wonder?
The quotes are, by and large, selected for their ability to be appreciated out of context, and so there's a low threshold of understanding: you don't have to read a lengthy top post or six layers of ancestor comments to understand a quote.
Short is good.
—Edsger Dijkstra