If there's a tradition of such adjudication - and if there's a good supply of rationalists - then people will hire them as long as they can agree in advance on submitting to arbitrage.

You know, this actually makes (entirely unintended) sense. If the rationalists are obliged to express their evaluations in the form of carefully designed and discrete bets then they are vulnerable to exploitation by others extracting arbitrage.

arbitrage

Presumably, "arbitration"--and that's a good point, and with clear precedents in the physical world. Nevertheless, "lawyer-y" behavior hasn't prevented a similar mutual-agreement-based system from flourishing, at least in the USA.

The biggest difference is that arbitrators are applying a similarly mutually-agreed-upon law, where rationalists mediating a non-rationalist dispute would be applying expertise outside the purview of the parties involved. That's where your point about advocacy-like behavior becomes important.

It's not an issue of weakening the defense/target, but a massive strengthening of the offense.

Aside from the doubling of the target's defense expenses (what, like that's irrelevant or chump change?), I can launch 50 or 100 suits against my target for nothing. At that point, a judge having a bad day is enough for me to become a millionaire. Any system which is so trivially exploitable is a seriously bad idea, and I'm a little surprised Eliezer thinks it's an improvement at all.

(I could try to do this with contingency-fees, but no sane firm would take my 100 frivolous suits on contingency payment and so I couldn't actually do this.)

Surely that only works if the probability of winning a case depends only on the skill of the lawyers, and not on the actual facts of the cases. I imagine a lawyer with no training at all could unravel your plan and make it clear that your hobos had nothing to back up their case.

If facts totally determine the case, then my exploit doesn't work but Eliezer's radical change is equally irrelevant. If facts have no bearing on who wins or loses, and it is purely down to the lawyers, then Eliezer's system turns lawsuits into a coin flip, which is only an improvement if you think that the current system gets things right less than 50% of the time, and you'd also have to show there would be no negating side-effects like people using my exploit. If facts determine somewhere in-between, then there is a substantial area where my exploit will still work.

Suppose I have to put up a minimum of 10k for each hobo lawsuit asking for 1 million; then I need only have a 1% chance of winning to break even. So if cases with lousy lawyers on both sides wind up with the wrong verdict even 2% of the time, I'm laughing all the way to the bank. And it's very easy for bad lawyering work to lose an otherwise extremely solid judgement. A small slipup might result in the defendant not even showing up, in which case the defendant gets screwed over by the default judgement against him. Even the biggest multinational can mess up: consider this recent case where Pepsi is contesting a $1.26 billion default judgement which was assessed because a secretary forgot a letter. They probably won't have to pay, but even if they settle for a tiny fraction of 1.26 billion, how many frivolous lawsuits do you think one fluke like that could fund?

For that matter, consider patent trolls; they have limited funds and currently operate quite successfully, despite the fact that they are generally suing multinationals who can spend far more than the troll on any given case. How much more effective would they be if those parasites could force their hosts to mount a far less lavish & effective defense than they would otherwise?

Also, being English myself, it hadn't dawned on me that the losers-pay rule doesn't apply everywhere. Having no such system at all seems really stupid.

I did some reading; apparently it's long-standing tradition all the way back to colonial times. The author said the Americans likely wanted to discourage litigation, which I suppose is the polite way of saying that early Americans were smuggling indebted IP-infringing scofflaws who didn't want civil justice to work too well.

It also occurs to me that hiring expensive lawyers under losers-pay is like trying to fix a futarchy: you don't lose anything if you succeeded, but you stand to lose a lot if you fail.

I don't really follow?

Well, the original said you could only not fund the legal defense; I don't see anything there stopping you from putting the bums up in a hotel or something during the lawsuits.

But even if defendants were required to spend the same as the plaintiff, we still run into the issue I already mentioned: So now I simply need to put up 5 or 10k for each bum, guaranteeing me a very crappy legal team but also guaranteeing my target a very crappy legal team.

The less competent the 2 lawyers are, the more the case becomes a role of the dice. (Imagine taking it down to the extreme where the lawyers are so stupid or incompetent they are replaceable by random number generators.) The most unpredictable chess game in the world is between the 2 rankest amateurs, not the current World Champion and #2.

But maybe your frivolous win-rate remains the same regardless of whether you put in 10k or a few million. There's still a problem: people already use frivolous lawsuits as weapons: forcing discovery, intrusive subpoenas, the sheer hassle, and so on. Those people, and many more, would regard this as a massive enhancement of lawsuits as a weapon.

You have an enemy? File a lawsuit, put in 20k, say, and now you can tell your crappy lawyer to spend an hour on it every so often just to keep it kicking. If your target blows his allotted 20k trying to get the lawsuit ended despite your delaying & harassing tactics, now you can sic your lawyer on the undefended target; if he measures out his budget to avoid this, then he has given into suffering this death of a thousand cuts. And if he goes without? As they say, someone who represents himself in court has a fool for a client....

I agree with Alicorn. Even if you pass the law, there's no practical way to stop people from getting private advice secretly, especially in advance of the court date. If you try real hard, private lawyers will go underground (and as the saying goes, only criminals will have lawyers :-) People will pass along illegal samizdat manuals of how to behave in court, half of them actually presenting harmful advice and none of them properly attributed. Congratulations: you have just forced lawyering to become a secret Dark Art.

Any other advice? What if I want to go to my Ethical Culture Society leader to ask him or her about whether something my in-court lawyer suggests would be right? What if my spouse is a lawyer? What if I'm a lawyer - a really expensive one?

I'm just waiting for LW to develop its own variants of profanities.

The purpose of arbitration isn't to establish the truth of a question. If that were the case there would be no reason for the arbitrator to even listen to the disagreeing parties. She would be better off just going off and looking for the answer on her own. This would also take much, much longer since she wouldn't want to leave any information out of the calculation.

Rather, the purpose of arbitration is to facilitate agreement. Not just any agreement but a kind of pseudo- Aumann style agreement between the two parties. The idea is that since people aren't natural Bayesian calculators and have all kinds of biases and incentives that keep them from agreeing they'll hire one to do the calculating for them. This means we want the result to be skewed toward the side with better arguments. If the side with weak arguments doesn't end up closer to the side with strong arguments then we're doing it wrong. This is true even if one side puts a lot more time or money into their arguments. Otherwise you'd have to conclude that arguing never has a point because the outcomes of arguments are skewed toward those who are the smartest, have done the most research and thought up the best arguments.