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Oscar_Cunningham comments on Re-understanding Robin Hanson’s “Pre-Rationality” - Less Wrong
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Comments (18)
Is it equivalent to state that leaning about the origins of your priors "screens off" the priors themselves?
If I understand correctly, priors are "beliefs we have whose causes we don't understand". Does it seem only to me, then, that if you have theories about the origins of your priors, then those cease to be your priors? Your real priors, instead, are now your theories about the origins of your "priors".
Hanson writes: "This paper thereby shows that agents who agree enough about the origins of their priors must have the same prior."
Isn't this really the same as saying: agents that have the same priors (= theories about the origins of their "priors") ought to reach the same conclusions given the same information - just as per Aumann's agreement theorem?
No, priors are not "beliefs whose causes we don't understand", and no this result doesn't reduce to common priors implies no agreeing to disagree.
You're saying P ⇒ Q, Robin is saying weaker-version-of-Q ⇒ P. I think.
Theorem 1 in the paper gives the essential conditional independence relation: given a prior assignment to yourself, any ordinary event E is independent of any other priors assigned to anyone else. Your prior screens events from all other prior assignments.