So you knowingly execute an inference process that has no correlation with the truth, because the possible-universes where it's wrong aren't morally significant, so you don't care what consequences the incorrect conclusions have here/there?
I don't see what morals have to do with it. I didn't talk about morals.
If you have a single STC, why do you hypothesize that the bridging law associates it with the copy of you that's going to die rather than one of the ones that survives? Or would you decline in the thought-experiment, not due to certainty of death, but due to uncertainty?
I am indeed uncertain, and so won't risk death. However, I do hypothesize that it's much more likely that, if a copy is created, my STC will remain with the original - inasfar as an original is identifiable. And when it is not identifiable, I fear that my STC will die entirely and not posses any of the clones.
What about consciousness that isn't arranged in threads? e.g. a branching structure, like the causal graph of the physics involved.
This is perfectly possible. In fact it's very likely. Because, if we create a clone, and if it necessarily has an STC of its own that is (in terms of memories and personality) a clone of the original's STC, then it makes at least as much sense to say that the STC branched than to say we somehow "created" a new STC to specification.
In this case I would anticipate becoming some one of the branches (clones). However, I do not know yet the probability weight of becoming each one, and AFAICS this can only be established empirically - and to test it at all I would have to risk the aforementioned chance of death.
In this scenario I wouldn't want people to torture clones of me in case I became them - but as long as a clearly identifiable original body remains intact, I very strongly expect my STC to remain associated with it, and not pass to a random clone, so if I'm not threatened I can mistreat my clones. And I certainly would never accept destruction of the original body no matter how many clones were created in exchange.
From the dawn of civilization humans believed in eternal life. The flesh may rot, but the soul will be reborn. To save the soul from the potential adverse living conditions (e.g. hell), the body, being the transient and thus the less important part, was expected to make sacrifices. To accumulate the best possible karma, pleasures of the flesh had to be given up or at least heavily curtailed.
Naturally the wisdom of this trade-off was questioned by many skeptical minds. The idea of reincarnation may have a strong appeal to imagination, but in absence of any credible evidence the Occam’s razor mercilessly cuts it into pieces. Instead of sacrificing for the sake of the future incarnations, a rationalist should live for the present. But does he really?
Consider the “incarnations” of the same person at different ages. Upon reaching the age of self-awareness, the earlier “incarnations” start making sacrifices for the benefit of the later ones. Dreams of becoming an astronaut at 25 may prompt a child of nine to exercise or study instead of playing. Upon reaching the age of 25, the same child may take a job at the bank and start saving for the potential retirement. Of course, legally all these “incarnations” are just the same person. But beyond jurisprudence, what is it that makes you who you are at the age of nine, twenty five or seventy?
Over the years your body, tastes, goals and the whole worldview are likely to undergo dramatic change. The single thing which remains essentially constant through your entire life is your DNA sequence. Through natural selection, evolution has ensured that we preferentially empathize with those whose DNA sequence is most similar to our own, i.e. our children, siblings and, most importantly, ourselves. But, instinct excepted, is there a reason why a rational self-conscious being must obey a program implanted in us by the unconscious force of evolution? If you identify more with your mind (personality/views/goals/…) than with the DNA sequence, why should you care more for someone who, living many years from now will resemble you less than some actual people living today?
P.S. I am aware that the meaning of “self” was debated by philosophers for many years, but I am really curious about the personal answers of “ordinary” rationalists to this question.