RobinHanson comments on Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions - Less Wrong

16 Post author: MichaelGR 11 November 2009 03:00AM

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Comment author: RobinHanson 13 November 2009 04:06:20AM *  2 points [-]

The point is that this is a subtle and central issue to engage, so I was suggesting that you to consider describing your analysis more explicitly. Is there is never any point in listening to academics on "silly" topics? Is there never any point in listening to academics who haven't explicitly told you how they've broken a problem down into modular parts, no matter now distinguished the are on related topics? Are people who have a modular parts analysis always a more reliable source than people who don't, no matter what else their other features? And so on.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 13 November 2009 04:56:35AM 12 points [-]

I confess, it doesn't seem to me on a gut level like this is either healthy to obsess about, or productive to obsess about. It seems more like worrying that my status isn't high enough to do work, than actually working. If someone shows up with amazing analyses I haven't considered, I can just listen to the analyses then. Why spend time trying to guess who might have a hidden deep analysis I haven't seen, when the prior is so much in favor of them having made a snap judgment, and it's not clear why if they've got a deep analysis they wouldn't just present it?

I think that on a purely pragmatic level there's a lot to be said for the Traditional Rationalist concept of demanding that Authority show its work, even if it doesn't seem like what ideal Bayesians would do.

Comment author: RobinHanson 13 November 2009 01:37:43PM *  3 points [-]

You have in the past thought my research on the rationality of disagreement to be interesting and spent a fair bit of time discussing it. It seemed healthy to me for you to compare your far view of disagreement in the abstract to the near view of your own particular disagreement. If it makes sense in general for rational agents to take very seriously the fact that others disagree, why does it make little sense for you in particular to do so?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 13 November 2009 02:17:43PM *  5 points [-]

You have in the past thought my research on the rationality of disagreement to be interesting and spent a fair but of time discussing it.

...and I've held and stated this same position pretty much from the beginning, no? E.g. http://lesswrong.com/lw/gr/the_modesty_argument/

t seemed healthy to me for you to compare your far view of disagreement in the abstract to the near view of your own particular disagreement.

I was under the impression that my verbal analysis matched and cleverly excused my concrete behavior.

If it makes sense in general for rational agents to take very seriously the fact that others disagree, why does it make little sense for you in particular to do so?

Well (and I'm pretty sure this matches what I've been saying to you over the last few years) just because two ideal Bayesians would do something naturally, doesn't mean you can singlehandedly come closer to Bayesianism by imitating the surface behavior of agreement. I'm not sure that doing elaborate analyses to excuse your disagreement helps much either. http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Occam%27s_Imaginary_Razor

I'd spend much more time worrying about the implications of Aumann agreement, if I thought the other party actually knew my arguments, took my arguments very seriously, took the Aumann problem seriously with respect to me in particular, and in general had a sense of immense gravitas about the possible consequences of abusing their power to make me update. This begins to approach the conditions for actually doing what ideal Bayesians do. Michael Vassar and I have practiced Aumann agreement a bit; I've never literally done the probability exchange-and-update thing with anyone else. (Edit: Actually on recollection I played this game a couple of times at a Less Wrong meetup.)

No such condition is remotely approached by disagreeing with the AAAI panel, so I don't think I could, in real life, improve my epistemic position by pretending that they were ideal Bayesians who were fully informed about my reasons and yet disagreed with me anyway (in which case I ought to just update to match their estimates, rather than coming up with elaborate excuses to disagree with them!)

Comment author: RobinHanson 13 November 2009 06:12:24PM 2 points [-]

Well I disagree with you strongly that there is no point in considering the views of others if you are not sure they know the details of your arguments, or of the disagreement literature, or that those others are "rational." Guess I should elaborate my view in a separate post.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 13 November 2009 09:13:11PM *  9 points [-]

There's certainly always a point in considering specific arguments. But to be nervous merely that someone else has a different view, one ought, generally speaking, to suspect (a) that they know something you do not or at least (b) that you know no more than them (or far more rarely (c) that you are in a situation of mutual Aumann awareness and equal mutual respect for one another's meta-rationality). As far as I'm concerned, these are eminent scientists from outside the field that I work in, and I have no evidence that they did anything more than snap judgment of my own subject material. It's not that I have specific reason to distrust these people - the main name I recognize is Horvitz and a fine name it is. But the prior probabilities are not good here.

I don't actually spend time obsessing about that sort of thing except when you're asking me those sorts of questions - putting so much energy into self-justification and excuses would just slow me down if Horvitz showed up tomorrow with an argument I hadn't considered.

I'll say again: I think there's much to be said for the Traditional Rationalist ideal of - once you're at least inside a science and have enough expertise to evaluate the arguments - paying attention only when people lay out their arguments on the table, rather than trying to guess authority (or arguing over who's most meta-rational). That's not saying "there's no point in considering the views of others". It's focusing your energy on the object level, where your thought time is most likely to be productive.

Is it that awful to say: "Show me your reasons"? Think of the prior probabilities!

Comment author: RobinHanson 14 November 2009 12:42:20AM *  13 points [-]

You admit you have not done much to make it easy to show them your reasons. You have not written up your key arguments in a compact form using standard style and terminology and submitted it to standard journals. You also admit you have not contacted any of them to ask them for their reasons; Horvitz would have have to "show up" for you to listen to him. This looks a lot like a status pissing contest; the obvious interpretation: Since you think you are better than them, you won't ask them for their reasons, and you won't make it easy for them to understand your reasons, as that would admit they are higher status. They will instead have to acknowledge your higher status by coming to you and doing things your way. And of course they won't since by ordinary standard they have higher status. So you ensure there will be no conversation, and with no conversation you can invoke your "traditional" (non-Bayesian) rationality standard to declare you have no need to consider their opinions.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 14 November 2009 01:19:06AM 6 points [-]

You're being slightly silly. I simply don't expect them to pay any attention to me one way or another. As it stands, if e.g. Horvitz showed up and asked questions, I'd immediately direct him to http://singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf (the chapter I did for Bostrom), and then take out whatever time was needed to collect the OB/LW posts in our discussion into a sequence with summaries. Since I don't expect senior traditional-AI-folk to pay me any such attention short of spending a HUGE amount of effort to get it and probably not even then, I haven't, well, expended a huge amount of effort to get it.

FYI, I've talked with Peter Norvig a bit. He was mostly interested in the CEV / FAI-spec part of the problem - I don't think we discussed hard takeoffs much per se. I certainly wouldn't have brushed him off if he'd started asking!

Comment author: mormon2 15 November 2009 03:50:15AM 8 points [-]

"and then take out whatever time was needed to collect the OB/LW posts in our discussion into a sequence with summaries."

Why? No one in the academic community would spend that much time reading all that blog material for answers that would be best given in a concise form in a published academic paper. So why not spend the time? Unless you think you are that much of an expert in the field as to not need the academic community. If that be the case where are your publications and where are your credentials, where is the proof of this expertise (expert being a term that is applied based on actual knowledge and accomplishments)?

"Since I don't expect senior traditional-AI-folk to pay me any such attention short of spending a HUGE amount of effort to get it and probably not even then, I haven't, well, expended a huge amount of effort to get it."

Why? If you expect to make FAI you will undoubtedly need people in the academic communities' help; unless you plan to do this whole project by yourself or with purely amateur help. I think you would admit that in its current form SIAI has a 0 probability of creating FAI first. That being said your best hope is to convince others that the cause is worthwhile and if that be the case you are looking at the professional and academic AI community.

I am sorry I prefer to be blunt.. that way there is no mistaking meanings...

Comment author: Alicorn 15 November 2009 02:38:32PM 3 points [-]

I think you would admit that in its current form SIAI has a 0 probability of creating FAI first.

No.

Comment author: wedrifid 15 November 2009 10:50:09AM *  0 points [-]

Since I don't expect senior traditional-AI-folk to pay me any such attention short of spending a HUGE amount of effort to get it and probably not even then, I haven't, well, expended a huge amount of effort to get it.

Why? If you expect to make FAI you will undoubtedly need people in the academic communities' help; unless you plan to do this whole project by yourself or with purely amateur help. ...

That 'probably not even then' part is significant.

That being said your best hope is to convince others that the cause is worthwhile and if that be the case you are looking at the professional and academic AI community.

Now that is an interesting question. To what extent would Eliezer say that conclusion followed? Certainly less than the implied '1' and probably more than '0' too.

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 07:02:23PM -2 points [-]

If there is a status pissing contest, they started it! ;-)

"On the latter, some panelists believe that the AAAI study was held amidst a perception of urgency by non-experts (e.g., a book and a forthcoming movie titled “The Singularity is Near”), and focus of attention, expectation, and concern growing among the general population."

Agree with them that there is much scaremongering going on in the field - but disagree with them about there not being much chance of an intelligence explosion.

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 07:23:29PM 0 points [-]

I wondered why these folk got so much press. My guess is that the media probably thought the "AAAI Presidential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures" had something to do with the a report commisioned indirectly for the country's president. In fact it just refers to the president of their organisation. A media-savvy move - though it probably represents deliberately misleading information.

Comment author: RobinHanson 14 November 2009 12:29:45AM 2 points [-]

Almost surely world class academic AI experts do "know something you do not" about the future possibilities of AI. To declare that topic to be your field and them to be "outside" it seems hubris of the first order.

Comment author: wedrifid 14 November 2009 01:28:37AM 4 points [-]

This conversation seems to be following what appears to me to be a trend in Robin and Eliezer's (observable by me) disagreements. This is one reason I would fascinated if Eliezer did cover Robin's initial question, informed somewhat by Eliezer's interpretation.

I recall Eliezer mentioning in a tangential comment that he disagreed with Robin not just on the particular conclusion but more foundationally on how much weight should be given to certain types of evidence or argument. (Excuse my paraphrase from hazy memory, my googling failed me.) This is a difference that extends far beyond just R & E and Eliezer has hinted at insights that intrigue me.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 14 November 2009 01:30:05AM 2 points [-]

Almost surely world class academic AI experts do "know something you do not" about the future possibilities of AI.

Does Daphne Koller know more than I do about the future possibilities of object-oriented Bayes Nets? Almost certainly. And, um... there are various complicated ways I could put this... but, well, so what?

(No disrespect intended to Koller, and OOBN/probabilistic relational models/lifted Bayes/etcetera is on my short-list of things to study next.)

Comment author: RobinHanson 14 November 2009 02:23:34PM 3 points [-]

How can you be so confident that you know so much about this topic that no world class AI expert could possibly know something relevant that you do not? Surely they considered the fact that people like you think you know a lot about this topic, and they nevertheless thought it reasonable to form a disagreeing opinion based on the attention they had given it. You want to dismiss their judgment as "snap" because they did not spend many hours considering your arguments, but they clearly disagree with that assessment of how much consideration your arguments deserve. Academic authorities are not always or even usually wrong when they disagree with less authoritative contrarians, even when such authorities do not review contrarian arguments in as much detail as contrarians think best. You want to dismiss the rationality of disagreement literature as irrelevant because you don't think those you disagree with are rational, but they probably don't think you are rational either, and you are probably both right. But the same essential logic also says that irrational people should take seriously the fact that other irrational people disagree with them.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 14 November 2009 05:38:18PM *  13 points [-]

How can you be so confident that you know so much about this topic that no world class AI expert could possibly know something relevant that you do not?

You changed what I said into a bizarre absolute. I am assuming no such thing. I am just assuming that, by default, world class experts on various topics in narrow AI, produce their beliefs about the Singularity by snap judgment rather than detailed modular analysis. This is a prior and hence an unstable probability - as soon as I see contrary evidence, as soon as I see the actual analysis, it gets revoked.

but they clearly disagree with that assessment of how much consideration your arguments deserve.

They have no such disagreement. They have no idea I exist. On the rare occasion when I encounter such a person who is physically aware of my existence, we often manage to have interesting though brief conversations despite their having read none of my stuff.

Academic authorities are not always or even usually wrong when they disagree with less authoritative contrarians

Science only works when you use it; scientific authority derives from science. If you've got Lord Kelvin running around saying that you can't have flying machines because it's ridiculous, the problem isn't that he's an Authority, the problem is that he's running on naked snap intuitive judgments of absurdity and the Wright Brothers are using actual math. The asymmetry in this case is not that pronounced but, even so, the default unstable prior is to assume that experts in narrow AI algorithms are not doing anything more complicated than this to produce their judgments about the probability of intelligence explosion - both the ones with negative affect who say "Never, you religious fear-monger!" and the ones with positive affect who say "Yes! Soon! And they shall do no wrong!" As soon as I see actual analysis, then we can talk about the actual analysis!

Added: In this field, what happens by default is that people talk complete nonsense. I spent my first years talking complete nonsense. In a situation like that, everyone has to show their work! Or at least show that they did some work! No exceptions!

Comment author: Thomas 14 November 2009 04:29:19PM 0 points [-]

Say that "Yudkowsky has no real clue" and that those "AI academics are right"? Just another crackpot among many "well educated", no big thing. Not worth to mention, almost.

Say, that this crackpot is of the Edisonian kind! In that case it is something well worth to mention.

Important enough to at least discuss with him ON THE TOPICS, and not on some meta level. Meta level discussion is sometimes (as here IMHO), just a waste of time.

Comment author: timtyler 13 November 2009 10:31:47PM *  2 points [-]

From that AAAI document:

"The group suggested outreach and communication to people and organizations about the low likelihood of the radical outcomes".

"Radical outcomes" seems like a case of avoiding refutation by being vague. However, IMO, they will need to establish the truth of their assertion before they will get very far there. Good luck to them with that.

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 10:41:57PM *  1 point [-]

The AAAI interim report is really too vague to bother much with - but I suspect they are making another error.

Many robot enthusiasts pour scorn on the idea that robots will take over the world. How To Survive A Robot Uprising is a classic presentation on this theme. A hostile takeover is a pretty unrealistic scenario - but these folk often ignore the possibility of a rapid robot rise from within society driven by mutual love. One day robots will be smart, sexy, powerful and cool - and then we will want to become more like them.

Comment author: timtyler 13 November 2009 10:27:39PM *  2 points [-]

Why will we witness an intelligence explosion? Because nature has a long history of favouring big creatures with brains - and because the capability to satisfy those selection pressures has finally arrived.

The process has already resulted in enormous data-centres, the size of factories. As I have said:

http://alife.co.uk/essays/the_intelligence_explosion_is_happening_now/

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 09:12:38PM 1 point [-]

Thinking about it, they are probably criticising the (genuinely dud) idea that an intelligence explosion will start suddenly at some future point with the invention of some machine - rather than gradually arising out of the growth of today's already self-improving economies and industries.

Comment author: Thomas 14 November 2009 09:24:19PM 0 points [-]

I think, both ways are still open. The intelligence explosion from a self-improving economy and the intelligence explosion from a fringe of this process.

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 09:34:49PM -1 points [-]

Did you take a look at my "The Intelligence Explosion Is Happening Now"? The point is surely a matter of history - not futurism.

Comment author: Thomas 14 November 2009 09:39:55PM 0 points [-]

Yes and you are right.

Comment author: timtyler 14 November 2009 09:59:32PM 0 points [-]

Great - thanks for your effort and input.