cousin_it comments on Contrarianism and reference class forecasting - Less Wrong

26 Post author: taw 25 November 2009 07:41PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (90)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Bongo 26 November 2009 09:01:09AM *  9 points [-]

I think taw's problem is just a case of the more general and simple problem of what kind of similarity is required for induction?.

And it's unwise to use political issues as case studies of unsolved philosophical problems.

Comment author: cousin_it 26 November 2009 10:59:28AM *  10 points [-]

I think you're completely right, this is a special case of the problem of induction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a wonderfully exhaustive article about it that also discusses subjective Bayesianism at length. Among other things, that article offers a simple recommendation for taw's original problem: intersect your proposed reference classes to get a smaller and more relevant reference class.