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EStokes comments on Open Thread: December 2009 - Less Wrong
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What are the implications to FAI theory of Robin's claim that most of what we do is really status-seeking? If an FAI were to try to extract or extrapolate our values, would it mostly end up with "status" as the answer and see our detailed interests, such as charity or curiosity about decision theory, as mere instrumental values?
I think it's kinda like inclusive genetic fitness: It's the reason you do things, but you're (usually) not conciously striving for an increased amount of it. So I don't think it could be called a terminal value, as such...
I had thought of that, but, if you consider a typical human mind as a whole instead of just the conscious part, it seems clear that it is striving for increased status. The same cannot be said for inclusive fitness, or at least the number of people who do not care about having higher status seems much lower than the number of people who do not care about having more offspring.
I think one of Robin's ideas is that unconscious preferences, not just conscious ones, should matter in ethical considerations. Even if you disagrees with that, how do you tell an FAI how to distinguish between conscious preferences and unconscious ones?