this post seems incredibly dense and convoluted. I literally do not know what you're talking about
That was not my experience. I understood everything in the first five paragraphs without having to reflect or even read a second time except that I did have to reflect for a few minutes on the last sentence of paragraph four. Although I am still less confident that I know what Justin intended there than I am with the other sentences, I am 72% confident I know. I think he meant that even if we are not religious, society tends to pull us into moral realism even though of course moral realism is an illusion. (Time constraints prevent me from reading the rest now.)
Defining "supergoal uncertainty" would be a necessary step
Oh, he did that. And the definition was quite clear to me on first reading, but then I have done a lot of math, and a lot of math in which I attempt my own definitions.
I think he meant that even if we are not religious, society tends to pull us into moral realism even though of course moral realism is an illusion.
You are correct, though I don't go as far as calling moral realism an illusion because of unknown unknowns (though I would be very surprised to find it isn't illusionary).
There is a common intuition and feeling that our most fundamental goals may be uncertain in some sense. What causes this intuition? For this topic I need to be able to pick out one’s top level goals, roughly one’s context insensitive utility function, and not some task specific utility function, and I do not want to imply that the top level goals can be interpreted in the form of a utility function. Following from Eliezer’s CFAI paper I thus choose the word “supergoal” (sorry Eliezer, but I am fond of that old document and its tendency to coin new vocabulary). In what follows, I will naturalistically explore the intuition of supergoal uncertainty.
To posit a model, what goal uncertainty (including supergoal uncertainty as an instance) means is that you have a weighted distribution over a set of possible goals and a mechanism by which that weight may be redistributed. If we take away the distribution of weights how can we choose actions coherently, how can we compare? If we take away the weight redistribution mechanism we end up with a single goal whose state utilities may be defined as the weighted sum of the constituent goals’ utilities, and thus the weight redistribution mechanism is necessary for goal uncertainty to be a distinct concept.
(ps I may soon post and explore the effects of supergoal uncertainty in its various reifications on making decisions. For instance, what implications, if any, does it have on bounded utility functions (and actions that depend on those bounds) and negative utilitarianism (or symmetrically positive utilitarianism)? Also, if anyone knows of related literature I would be happy to check it out.)
(pps Dang, the concept of supergoal uncertainty is surprisingly beautiful and fun to explore, and I now have a vague wisp of an idea of how to integrate a subset of these with TDT/UDT)