It also seemed to me that assigning 0.001 to Knox's guilt was safer than assigning 0.999 to Guede's guilt,
That's interesting. I'm wondering if you could elaborate on why you think that's so, since I would have guessed the opposite.
It's a question of whether errors in the story you know make the probability more extreme or less extreme. Knox seems like a bystander, pretty much, so the "privileging the hypothesis" concept applies to her. Guede seems pretty definitely involved, but the probability of error or misunderstanding the story might not be so low as 1 in 1000, and errors in his story make the probability less extreme.
It's a question of how you try to apply compensation for overconfidence. With Guede, you apply compensation by lowering the probability of his guilt....
Followup to: The Amanda Knox Test: How an Hour on the Internet Beats a Year in the Courtroom
See also: The Importance of Saying "Oops"
I'm posting this to call attention to the fact that I've now reconsidered the highly confident probability estimates in my post from yesterday on the Knox/Sollecito case. I haven't retracted my arguments; I just now think the level of confidence in them that I specified was too high. I've added the following paragraph to the concluding section:
While object-level comments on the case and on my reasoning about it should probably continue to be confined to that thread, I'd be interested in hearing in comments here what people think about the following: