wedrifid comments on The Contrarian Status Catch-22 - Less Wrong

49 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 19 December 2009 10:40PM

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Comment author: PhilGoetz 21 December 2009 05:52:06AM *  1 point [-]

I haven't seen you take into account the relative costs of error of the two beliefs.

A few months ago, I asked:

Suppose Omega or one of its ilk says to you, "Here's a game we can play. I have an infinitely large deck of cards here. Half of them have a star on them, and one-tenth of them have a skull on them. Every time you draw a card with a star, I'll double your utility for the rest of your life. If you draw a card with a skull, I'll kill you."

How many cards do you draw?

I think that someone who believes in many-worlds will keep drawing cards until they die. Someone who believes in one world might not. An expected-utility maximizer would; but I'm uncomfortable about playing the lottery with the universe if it's the only one we've got.

If a rational, ethical one-worlds believer doesn't continue drawing cards as long as they can, in a situation where the many-worlds believer would, then we have an asymmetry in the cost of error. Building an FAI that believes in one world, when many worlds is true, causes (possibly very great) inefficiency and repression to delay the destruction all life. Building an FAI that believes in many worlds, when one world is true, results in annihilating all life in short order. This large asymmetry is enough to compensate for a large asymmetry in probabilities.

(My gut instinct is that there is no asymmetry, and that having a lot of worlds shouldn't make you less careless with any of them. But that's just my gut instinct.)

Also, I also think that you can't, at present, both be rational about updating in response to the beliefs of others, and dismiss one-world theory as dead.

Comment author: wedrifid 21 December 2009 06:04:45AM *  3 points [-]

I think that someone who believes in many-worlds will keep drawing cards until they die. Someone who believes in one world might not. An expected-utility maximizer would; but I'm uncomfortable about playing the lottery with the universe if it's the only one we've got.

Omega clearly has more than one universe up his sleeve. It doesn't take too many doublings of my utility function before a further double would require more entropy than is contained in this one. Just how many galaxies worth of matter perfectly optimised for my benefit do I really need?

The problem here is that is hard to imagine Omega actually being able to double utility. Doubling utility is hard. It really would be worth the risk of gambling indefinitely if Omega actually had the power to do what he promised. If it isn't, then you by definition have your utility function wrong. In fact, if exactly half of the cards killed you and the other half doubled utility it would still be worth gambling unless you assign exactly 0 utility to anything else in the universe in the case of your death.

Comment author: Strange7 24 December 2010 12:23:46PM 0 points [-]

It doesn't take too many doublings of my utility function before a further double would require more entropy than is contained in this one.

Omega knows you'll draw a skull before you get that many doublings.

Comment author: wedrifid 24 December 2010 01:26:13PM 0 points [-]

Omega knows you'll draw a skull before you get that many doublings.

That would be a different problem. Either the participant is informed that the probability distribution in question has anthropic bias based on the gamemaster's limits or the gamemaster is not Omega-like.