= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
pdf23ds comments on Open Thread: January 2010 - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (725)
If quantum immortality is correct, and assuming life extension technologies and uploading are delayed for a long time, wouldn't each of us, in our main worldline, become more and more decrepit and injured as time goes on, until living would be terribly and constantly painful, with no hope of escape?
I present for your consideration a delightful quote, courtesy of a discussion on another site:
I think the moral of the story is: stay healthy and able-bodied as much as possible. If, at some point, you should find yourself surviving far beyond what would be reasonably expected, it might be wise to attempt some strategic quantum suicide reality editing while you still have the capacity to do so...
We frequently become unconscious (sleep) in our threads of experience. There is no obvious reason we couldn't fall comatose after becoming sufficiently battered.
A superhuman intelligence that understood the nature of human consciousness and subjective experience would presumably know whether QI was correct, incorrect, or somehow a wrong question. Consciousness and experience all happen within physics, they just currently confuse the hell out of us.
Neat paper!
As I understand it, it makes a prediction about your future experience (and the MWI measure of that experience)--not dying. Is that not falsifiable? I suppose you could argue that it's a logical and inescapable consequence of MWI, and not in itself falsifiable, but that doesn't seem like an important distinction.
I don't see how Tegmark's paper is relevant to this question.
"The author recommends that anyone reading this story sign up with Alcor or the Cryonics Institute to have their brain preserved after death for later revival under controlled conditions."
(From a little story which assumes QTI.)
Even supposing this unpleasant scenario is true, it is not hopeless. There are things we can do to improve matters. The timescale to develop life extension and uploading is not a prior constant; we can work to speed it up, and we should be doing this anyway. And we can sign up for cryonics to obtain a better alternative worldline.
Not if, as is at least conceivable*, enough Friendly superintelligences model the past and reconstruct people from it that eventually most of your measure comes from them. (Or other, mostly less pleasant but seemingly much less likely possibilities.)
* It actually seems a lot more than "at least conceivable" to me, but I trust this seeming very little, since the idea is so comforting.
That requires a double assumption about not just quantum immortality, but about "subjective measure / what happens next" continuing into all copies of a computation, rather than just the local causal future of a computation.
Right, MWI has a different causal structure than other multiverses and quantum immortality is a distinct case of, call it 'modal-realist immortality'. I do tend to forget that.
Sorry, could you repeat that? Both clauses?