Yudkowsky briefly addressed moral luck:

Let's say someone gravely declares, of some moral dilemma [...] that there is no moral answer; both options are wrong and blamable; whoever faces the dilemma has had poor moral luck. Fine, let's suppose this is the case: then when you cannot be innocent, justified, or praiseworthy, what will you choose anyway?

Lately I've actually been thinking that maybe we should split up morality into two concepts, and deal with them separately: one referring to moral sentiments, and another referring to what we actually do. It seems like a lot of discussions of utilitarianism versus deontology treat them as two arbitrary viewpoints or positions, but insofar as my thinking has trended utilitarian lately, it hasn't been because I'm attracted to a utilitarian position, but because Cox's theorem [edit: sic] forces it. Even if I draw up a set of rights that I think must not be violated, I'm still going to have to make decisions under uncertainty, which I would guess means acting to minimize the expected number of rights-violations.