RobinZ comments on Consciousness - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (221)
What dire consequences should we expect if we do, in fact, deny that there is anything that is blue ?
For my money, the discussion in p.375 and onwards of Consciousness Explained says all there is to say (in addition to theories of electromagnetism, optics and so on) about the experience of color.
I can't really do justice to that section in a comment here, but I will note its starting point:
The key insight for me is here:
There is no reason, prior to megayears of evolution, to expect that anything such as color exists. That changes with apple trees' "need" to advertise the ripeness of their fruit, to creatures which, though hardly conscious, happen to be equipped with the ability to discriminate certain properties of the fruit at a distance. This "need" results from a) the existence of a certain optimization algorithm, Darwinian evolution, and b) contigent facts about the environment in which this algorithm unfolds.
What I take the "experience of color" to be, if it has to be anything, is an evolved equilibrium between competing strategies, together with the entire history of the genes in which these strategies were encoded.
Your first line ("What dire consequences should we expect if we do, in fact, deny that there is anything that is blue ?") is an appeal to the consequences of a belief about a matter of fact, and therefore irrelevant.
What remains without that is good.
"What dire conceptual consequences", if you prefer. Mitchell says "you can do a Dennett" as if that was enough to scare away any reasonable person. I'd like to know what is so scary about Dennett's conclusions.
Ah, that's clearer. I retract my implications.