What follows is the abstract from "Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity", Daniel Kolak.

Sydney Shoemaker leads today's "neo-Lockean" liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of "neo-Aristotelians" such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke's actual view. Shoemaker's defense, which uses a "package deal" definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey-Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists--which happens to be also Locke's actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called "ambiguity of is" collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the "Frege trichotomy." The Ramsey-Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein "consciousness," "self-consciousness," and the "I," can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself.

I think it is safe to say that this was not written for a general audience. Before I spend any more of my time trying to decipher text with no expectation of enjoyment, I would like to know - in lay terms - what bearing it has upon Mitchell_Porter's remarks.

Edit: If, as Jack states, there is no relation, it would behoove you to write a summary in lay terms as a top level post rather than drop it into a merely tangentially related discussion.

Googling Kolak I can see he indeed holds the very strange view that I am identical to you. But this particular paper basically consists of a decent outline of the present personal identity debate and a brief statement of Kolak's own view which for me, is a vague, mysterious description of a view that basically says "I am the the thing that the indexical "I" points to in this sentence." Which is a perfectly fine view except that it answers hardly any questions (My reply is "Duh, now is that thing a body or a psychological state?") Then somehow in the remaining paragraphs this becomes "the brain is not sufficient for personal identity" and strange, out of context Wittgenstein quotes. Anyway, it didn't really have anything to do with this discussion.