byrnema comments on Hypotheses For Dualism - Less Wrong

1 Post author: byrnema 09 January 2010 08:05AM

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Comment author: byrnema 09 January 2010 04:07:56PM *  0 points [-]

This quote reminds me of comments by Searle on how Computationalist or Connectionist theories of mind assert a form of Strong Dualism that really fails to be a criticism of these stances, due to a false implication that these stances are somehow cartesian.

This sounds interesting but I don't know what any of the words mean. Could you clarify please if you are tactfully/mildly suggesting in your comment that my hypothesis for dualism is dualist? (If so, I'll be more interested and motivated to research those terms.)

Comment author: MatthewB 10 January 2010 03:07:24PM 0 points [-]

Searle asserts that Computationalism or Connectionism explicitly suggests that the mind and body are different, because if all a mind happens to be is a collection of symbols being computed, (or connections of patterns) then the mind would just be the program (or diagram of the patterns), and this could be written down on a hard copy.

Yet, Searle fails to take into account that the mind isn't the hard copy, but it is only the hard copy of an instance of the program in operation.

Searle also denies that there can be multiple instances of the same mind (and, he is both right and wrong about that, but like most of his philosophy of mind, he really fails to follow through with his description of why this is the case).

Which led to my question: What am I if I am not the processes....

Now, if you are a dualist, which I was rather caught by... Then my reply is rather pointless.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 10 January 2010 07:46:51AM 0 points [-]

I don't understand it, but I don't think it can be understood. He says that a theory X assert a form of the theory Y that fails to be a criticism of the theory X. Nobody holding theory X would assert theory Y, and want theory Y to be a criticism of theory X. So this can't make any sense, no matter what the words mean.