Being No One, Metzinger. Review and overview here. Precis here.

I started in on the precis, but a serious problem with his first three constraints popped up for me right away: a thermostat implements "minimal consciousness" by those rules, as it has a global world-model that cannot be seen by the thermostat to be a world model.

I don't see this as a problem with the ideas presented, mind you, it's more of a problem in the statement of the constraints. I think that what he meant to require that a conscious system have a subsystem which can selectively observe a limited subset of a nonconcsious model of the world. (In which case a thermostat would fail, since it has only a single, non-reflective level of modeling.)

Much of the precis (or at least the 20% I got through before getting tired of wading through vague and ambiguous language full of mind-projections) seems to have similar problems. It's definitely not an implementation specification for consciousness, as far as I can tell, but at the same time I have found little fault with what the author appears to be pointing towards. The answers given seem vaguely helpful, but tend to raise new questions.