Vladimir_Nesov comments on Normal Cryonics - Less Wrong

58 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 19 January 2010 07:08PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (930)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: ciphergoth 31 May 2010 03:12:21PM -1 points [-]

Agreed - but that caveat doesn't apply in this instance, does it?

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 31 May 2010 04:13:00PM *  0 points [-]

It does apply, the argument you attacked is wrong for a different reason. Amusingly, I see your original comment, and the follow-up arguments for incorrectness of the previous arguments as all wrong (under assumptions not widely accepted though). Let's break it up:

(1) "If I am revived, I expect to live for billions of years"
(2) "That seems wildly optimistic"
(3) "We must first think about what we anticipate, and our level of optimism must flow from that"

(3) is wrong because the general pattern of reasoning from how good the postulated outcome is to its plausibility is valid. (2) is wrong because it's not in fact too optimistic, quite the opposite. And (1) is wrong because it's not optimistic enough. If your concepts haven't broken down when the world is optimized for a magical concept of preference, it's not optimized strongly enough. "Revival" and "quality of life" are status quo natural categories which are unlikely to survive strong optimization according to the whole of human preference in a recognizable form.

Comment author: complexmeme 02 June 2010 06:36:56PM 0 points [-]

Do you think that if someone frozen in the near future is revived, that's likely to happen after a friendly-AI singularity has occurred? If so, what's your reasoning for that assumption?