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Nominull comments on Outline of a lower bound for consciousness - Less Wrong
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So if I understand correctly, your basic claim underlying all of this is that a system can be said not to be conscious if its set of beliefs remains equally valid when you switch the labels on some of the things it has beliefs about. I have a few concerns about this point, which you may have already considered, but which I would like to see addressed explicitly. I will post them as replies to this post.
If I am mischaracterizing your position, please let me know, and then my replies to this post can probably be ignored.
How can one grounding be falsifiable and another not, and the two groundings still be entirely indistinguishable? If there is a difference, shouldn't there be some difference? How would they flicker back and forth, as you say, like a Necker cube? Wouldn't there be some truth of the matter?
I don't think they can. I wanted to accommodate people who believe that qualia are part of groundings, and that you would have a different grounding if you swapped the experience of blue with the experience of red, rather than argue about it.