cousin_it comments on Advice for AI makers - Less Wrong

7 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 14 January 2010 11:32AM

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Comment author: cousin_it 18 January 2010 01:48:04PM *  6 points [-]

If you think anthropics has saved us from AI many times, you ought to believe we will likely die soon, because anthropics doesn't constrain the future, only the past. Each passing year without catastrophe should weaken your faith in the anthropic explanation.

Comment author: satt 30 June 2014 09:06:20PM *  1 point [-]

The first sentence seems obviously true to me, the second probably false.

My reasoning: to make observations and update on them, I must continue to exist. Hence I expect to make the same observations & updates whether or not the anthropic explanation is true (because I won't exist to observe and update on AI extinction if it occurs), so observing a "passing year without catastrophe" actually has a likelihood ratio of one, and is not Bayesian evidence for or against the anthropic explanation.

Comment author: Houshalter 01 October 2013 11:40:15PM 1 point [-]

Wouldn't the anthropic argument apply just as much in the future as it does now? The world not being destroyed is the only observable result.

Comment author: [deleted] 02 October 2013 12:50:06AM -1 points [-]

The future hasn't happened yet.

Comment author: Houshalter 02 October 2013 02:32:47AM 0 points [-]

Right. My point was in the future you are still going to say "wow the world hasn't been destroyed yet" even if in 99% of alternate realities it was. cousn_it said:

Each passing year without catastrophe should weaken your faith in the anthropic explanation.

Which shouldn't be true at all.

If you can not observe a catastrophe happen, then not observing a catastrophe is not evidence for any hypothesis.

Comment author: nshepperd 02 October 2013 04:45:22AM 1 point [-]

"Not observing a catastrophe" != "observing a non-catastrophe". If I'm playing russian roulette and I hear a click and survive, I see good reason to take that as extremely strong evidence that there was no bullet in the chamber.

Comment author: Houshalter 02 October 2013 06:19:51AM 1 point [-]

But doesn't the anthropic argument still apply? Worlds where you survive playing russian roulette are going to be ones where there wasn't a bullet in the chamber. You should expect to hear a click when you pull the trigger.

Comment author: nshepperd 02 October 2013 06:24:32AM *  0 points [-]

As it stands, I expect to die (p=1/6) if I play russian roulette. I don't hear a click if I'm dead.

Comment author: Houshalter 02 October 2013 10:18:18PM 1 point [-]

That's the point. You can't observe anything if you are dead, therefore any observations you make are conditional on you being alive.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 June 2014 06:40:59AM 0 points [-]

Those universes where you die still exist, even if you don't observe them. If you carry your logic to its conclusion, there would be no risk to playing russian roulette, which is absurd.

Comment author: shminux 28 June 2014 07:26:11AM *  2 points [-]

The standard excuse given by those who pretend to believe in many worlds is that you are likely to get maimed in the universes where you get shot but don't die, which is somewhat unpleasant. If you come up with a more reliable way to quantum suicide, like using a nuke, they find another excuse.

Comment author: Houshalter 28 June 2014 03:04:04PM 0 points [-]

I'm saying that you can only observe not dying. Not that you shouldn't care about universes that you don't exist in or observe.

The risk in Russian roulette is, in the worlds where you do survive you will probably be lobotomized, or drop the gun shooting someone else, etc. Ignoring that, there is no risk. As long as you don't care about universes where you die.