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timtyler comments on Dennett's heterophenomenology - Less Wrong
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Comments (23)
The only proposed explanation of consciousness I've seen on Less Wrong is "maybe if we arrange stuff in the right way, consciousness will happen". Even if true, it's not enough of an explanation to enable argument about it.
Dennett presents a resolutely functionalist description of experience, then tells us that nothing resembling qualia can be found within it, to the great surprise of no-one at all.
To believe that the phenomenal world, the world you actually live in, is a fiction, while an invented "physical" world, for which no evidence exists, is the real world, is not merely wrong, it's an irrationality which makes a complete mockery of the goals of this website.
There is evidence that the "real" world exists, for most reasonable uses of the term "evidence".
Evidence implies observation. Observation implies conscious experience. So your evidence for a world independent of conscious experience turns out to be ... conscious experience. I expect you can see why that isn't going to work.
No, I can't. Conscious experience is our evidence for the existence of the real world.
The hypothesis that the real world exists seems favoured heavily by Occam's razor.
If there was no world out there, life would probably be a lot more like dreaming is.
In what sense does this "not work"? All of modern technology was designed and constructed under the paradigm that there is a world independent of conscious experience - the competing framework has produced bupkis.