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Zachary_Kurtz comments on What big goals do we have? - Less Wrong
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I recently read a history of western ethical philosophy and the argument boiled down to this: Without God or deity, human experience/life has no goals or process to work towards and therefore no need for ethics. Humans ARE in fact ethical and behave as though working towards some purpose, so therefore that purpose must exist and therefore god exists.
This view was frustrating to no end. Do humans have to prescribe purpose to the universe in order to satisfy some psychological need?
What is the goal or process supposed to be in the presence of God? Get to heaven and experience eternal happy-fun-time?
Something grand-sounding but incomprehensible, like every other God-of-the-gaps answer.
Charitably, the same as the goal in the presence of a Friendly singularity.
You're not supposed to ask. Hence the phrase semantic stopsign.
The goal in the presence of God is to continue to worship God. Forever. To people actually worshiping God right now, this seems wonderful. Or, at least, they say it does, and I don't see any reason to disbelieve them.
Was any argument given for this claim?
Interesting, this is exactly how I felt a week ago. I am the product of western culture, after all. Anyway, if no arguments are provided I can explain the reasoning since I'm pretty familiar with it. I also know exactly where the error in reasoning was.
The error is this: the reasoning assumes that humans desires are designed in a way that makes sense with respect to the way reality is. In other words, that we're not inherently deluded or mislead by our basic nature in some (subjectively) unacceptable way. However, the unexamined premise behind this is that we were designed with some care. With the other point of view -- that we are designed by mechanisms with no in-borne mechanism concerned for our well-being -- it is amazing that experience isn't actually more insufferable than it is. Well, I realize that perhaps it is already as insufferable as it can be without more negatively affecting fitness.
But imagine, we could have accidentally evolved a neurological module that experiences excruciating pain constantly, but is unable to engage with behavior in a way to effect selection, and is unable to tell us about itself. Or it is likely, given the size of mind-space, that there are other minds experiencing intense suffering without the ability to seek reprieve in non-existence. How theism works explains that while theists are making stuff up, they can make up everything to be as good as they wish. On the other hand, without a God to keep things in check, there is no limit on how horrible reality can be.
Interestingly, this is the exact opposite of Zen, in which it's considered a premise that we are inherently deluded and misled by our basic nature... and in large part due to our need to label things. As in How An Algorithm Feels From Inside, Zen attempts to point out that our basic nature is delusion: we feel as though questions like "Does the tree make a sound?" and "What is the nature of objective morality?" actually have some sort of sensible meaning.
(Of course, I have to say that Eliezer's writing on the subject did a lot more for allowing me to really grasp that idea than my Zen studies ever did. OTOH, Zen provides more opportunities to feel as though the world is an undifferentiated whole, its own self with no labels needed.)
Eliezer Yudkowsky made quite a good essay on this theme - Beyond the Reach of God.
Without God there's no end game, just fleeting existence.
Thanks for the edit to the original comment; I was unsure whether you were arguing for a view or just describing it (though I assumed the latter based on your other comments).
Like the statement in the original comment (and like most arguments for religion), this one is in great need of unpacking. People invoke things like "ultimate purpose" without saying what they mean. But I think a lot of people who agreed with the above would say that life is worthless if it simply ends when the body dies. To which I say:
If a life that begins and eventually ends has no "meaning" or "purpose" (whatever those words mean), then an infinitely long one doesn't either. Zero times infinity is still zero.
(Of course I know what the everyday meanings of "meaning" and "purpose" are, but those obviously aren't the meanings religionists use them with.)
Edit: nerzhin points out that Zero times infinity is not well defined. (Cold comfort, I think, to the admittedly imaginary theist making the "finite life is worthless" argument.)
I am a math amateur; I understand limit notation and "f(x)" notation, but I failed to follow the reasoning at the MathWorld link. Does nerzhin or anyone else know someplace that spells it out more? (Right now I'm studying the Wikipedia "Limit of a function" page.)
Strictly speaking, no.
I am reminded of The Parable of the Pawnbroker.
Edit: Original link.
Edit: this comment happens to reply to an out-of-context sentence that is not endorsed by Zachary_Kurtz. Thanks to grouchymusicologist for noticing my mistake.
You happen to be wrong on this one. Please read the sequences, in particular the Metaethics sequence and Joy in the Merely Real.
Pretty sure ZK is not endorsing this view but instead responding to the query "Was any argument given for this claim?"
Upvoted ZK's comment for this reason.
Thanks, my mistake.
no problem.. it happens
Did it even attempt to address goal-seeking behaviour in animals, plants etc?
only to deny that higher order goals existed (achieve basic survival, without regards to ethical system).
So it's just another God-of-the-gaps argument: this aspect of human behaviour is mysterious, therefore God. Only it's a gap that we already know a lot about how to close.
The 'God-of-the-gaps' argument is thrown around very frequently where it doesn't fit.
No, theists reason that this aspect of human behavior requires God to be fully coherent, therefore God. Instead of just accepting that their behavior is not fully coherent.
Evolution designed us to value things but it didn't (can't) give us a reason to value those things. If you are going to value those things anyway, then I commend your complacency with the natural order of things, but you might still admit that your programming is incoherent if it simultaneously makes you want to do things for a reason and then makes you do things for no reason.
(If I sound angry it's because I'm furious, but not at you cithergoth. I'm angry with futility. I'll write up a post later describing what it's like to be 95% deconverted from belief in objective morality.)
Sure it did. The reason to value our terminal values is that we value our terminal values. For example, I want to exist. Why should I continue to want to exist? Because if I stop wanting to exist, I'll probably stop existing, which would be bad, because I want to exist.
Yes, this is a justificatory loop, but so what? This isn't a rhetorical question. So what? Such loops are neither illogical nor incoherent.
The incoherence is that I also value purpose. An inborn anti-Sisyphus value.
Sisyphus could have been quite happy about his task; pushing a rock around is not intrinsically so bad, but he was also given the awareness that what he did was purposeless. It's too bad he didn't value simply existing more than he did. Which is the situation in which I'm in, in which none of my actions will ever make an objective difference in a completely neutral, value-indifferent universe.
(If this is a simulation I'm in, you can abort it now I don't like
I know, but assuming you're a human and no aliens have messed with your brain, it's highly unlikely that this value is a terminal one. You may believe it's terminal, but your belief is wrong. The solution to your problem is simple: Stop valuing objective purpose.
Can you expand on this please? How do you know it's highly unlikely?
First, it doesn't seem like the kind of thing evolution would select for. Our brains may be susceptible to making the kind of mistake that leads one to believe in the existence of (and the need for) objective morality, but that would be a bias, not a terminal value.
Second, we can simply look at the people who've been through a transition similar to byrnema's, myself included. Most of us have successfully expunged (or at least minimized) the need for an Objective Morality from our moral architecture, and the few I know who've failed are badly, badly confused about metaethics. I don't see how we could have done this if the need for an objective morality was terminal.
Of course I suppose there's a chance that we're freaks.
Bravo! We came up with this solution simultaneously -- possibly the most focused solution to theism we have.
My brain is happy with the proposed solution. I'll see if it works...
I'm updating this thread, about a month later.
I found that I wasn't able to make any progress in this direction.
(Recall the problem was the possibility of "true" meaning or purpose without objective value, and the solution proposed was to "stop valuing objective value". That is, find value in values that are self-defined.)
However, I wasn't able to redefine (reparametrize?) my values as independent of objective value. Instead, I found it much easier to just decide I didn't value the problem. So I find myself perched indifferently between continuing to care about my values (stubbornly) and 'knowing' that values are nonsense.
I thought I had to stop caring about value or about objective value .. actually, all I had to do was stop caring about a resolution. I guess that was easier.
I consider myself having 'progressed' to the stage of wry-and-superficially-nihilist. (I don't have the solution, you don't either, and I might as well be amused.)
How odd. I remember that one of the key steps for me was realizing that if my drive for objective purpose could be respectable, than so could all of my other terminal values like having fun and protecting people. But I don't think I've ever heard someone else identify that as their key step until now... assuming we are talking about the same mental step.
It seems like there's just a big library of different "key insights" that different people require in order to collapse transcendent morality to morality.
That was totally awesome to watch. Thanks byrnema and Furcas!
If it's any consolation, you're likely to be a lot happier out the other side of your deconversion. When you're half converted, it feels like there is a True Morality, but it doesn't value anything. When you're out the other side you'll be a lot happier feeling that your values are enough.
Yeah, with your comment I do see the light at the end of the tunnel. What it has pointed out to me is that while I'm questioning all my values, I might as well question my value of 'objective' value. It should be neurologically possible to displace my value of "objective good" to "subjective good". However, I'm not sure that it would be consistent to remain an epistemological realist after that, given my restructured values. But that would be interesting, not the end of the world.
I don't understand this. Can you say it again with different words? I am specifically choking on "designed" and "reason."
We're the product of evolution, yes? That's what I meant by 'designed'.
When I drive to the store, I have a reason: to buy milk. I also have a reason to buy milk. I also have a reason for that. A chain of reasons ending in a terminal value given to me by evolution -- something you and I consider 'good'. However, I have no loyalty to evolution. Why should I care about the terminal value it instilled in me? Well, I understand it made me care. I also understand that the rebellion I feel about being forced to do everything is also the product of evolution. And I finally understand that there's no limit in how bad the experience can be for me as a result of these conflicting desires. I happen to be kind of OK (just angry) but the universe would just look on, incuriously, if I decided to go berserk and prove there was no God by showing there is no limit on how horrible the universe could be. How's that for a big goal?
I imagine that somebody who cares about me will suggest I don't post anything for a while, until I feel more sociable. I'll take that advice.
Why would you feel differently about God? It always struck me that if God existed he had to be a tremendous asshole given all the suffering in the world. Reading the old testament certainly paints a picture of a God I would have no loyalty to and would have no reason to care about his terminal values. Evolution seems positively benevolent by comparison.
You shouldn't care about your values because they're instilled in you by evolution, your true alien Creator. It is the same mistake as believing you have to behave morally because God says so. You care about your values not because of their historical origin or specifically privileged status, but because they happen to be the final judge of what you care about.
Is this a fair summary:
Or is this closer:
I am guessing the former. Feel free to take a good break if you want. We'll be here when you get back. :)
What would you infer from my choice? I honestly cannot tell the difference between the two statements.
Well, the difference is mostly semantic but this is a good way to reveal minor differences in definitions that are not inherently obvious. If you see them as the same than they are same for the purposes of the conversation which is all I needed to know. :)
The reason I asked for clarification is that this sentence:
Can be read by some as:
To which I immediately thought, "Wait, if it is the reason, why isn't that the reason?" The problem is just a collision of the terms "design" and "reason." By replacing "design" with "cause" and "reason" with "purpose" your meaning was made clear.