Sideways comments on My Fundamental Question About Omega - Less Wrong

6 Post author: MrHen 10 February 2010 05:26PM

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Comment author: MrHen 10 February 2010 08:30:57PM 5 points [-]

I don't know how to respond to this or Morendil's second comment. I feel like I am missing something obvious to everyone else but when I read explanations I feel like they are talking about a completely unrelated topic.

Things like this:

You seem to be confused about free will. Keep reading the Sequences and you won't be.

Confuse me because as far as I can tell, this has nothing to do with free will. I don't care about free will. I care about what happens when a perfect predictor enters the room.

Is such a thing just completely impossible? I wouldn't have expected the answer to this to be Yes.

If you do know what the prediction is, then the way in which you react to that prediction determines which prediction you'll hear. For example, if I walk up to someone and say, "I'm good at predicting people in simple problems, I'm truthful, and I predict you'll give me $5," they won't give me anything. Since I know this, I won't make that prediction. If people did decide to give me $5 in this sort of situation, I might well go around making such predictions.

Okay, yeah, so restrict yourself only to the situations where people will give you the $5 even though you told them the prediction. This is a good example of my frustration. I feel like your response is completely irrelevant. Experience tells me this is highly unlikely. So what am I missing? Some key component to free will? A bad definition of "perfect predictor"? What?

To me the scenario seems to be as simple as: If Omega predicts X, X will happen. If X wouldn't have happened, Omega wouldn't predict X.

I don't see how including "knowledge of the prediction" into X makes any difference. I don't see how whatever definition of free will you are using makes any difference.

"Go read the Sequences" is fair enough, but I wouldn't mind a hint as to what I am supposed to be looking for. "Free will" doesn't satiate my curiosity. Can you at least tell me why Free Will matters here? Is it something as simple as, "You cannot predict past a free will choice?"

As it is right now, I haven't learned anything other than, "You're wrong."

Comment author: Sideways 10 February 2010 09:28:50PM *  0 points [-]

When a human brain makes a decision, certain computations take place within it and produce the result. Those computations can be perfectly simulated by a sufficiently-more-powerful brain, e.g. Omega. Once Omega has perfectly simulated you for the relevant time, he can make perfect predictions concerning you.

Perfectly simulating any computation requires at least as many resources as the computation itself (1), so AFAICT it's impossible for anything, even Omega, to simulate itself perfectly. So a general "perfect predictor" may be impossible. But in this scenario, Omega doesn't have to be a general perfect predictor; it only has to be a perfect predictor of you.

From Omega's perspective, after running the simulation, your actions are determined. But you don't have access to Omega's simulation, nor could you understand it even if you did. There's no way for you to know what the results of the computations in your brain will be, without actually running them.

If I recall the Sequences correctly, something like the previous sentence would be a fair definition of Eliezer's concept of free will.

(1) ETA: On second thought this need not be the case. For example, f(x) = ( (x *10) / 10 ) +1 is accurately modeled by f(x) = x+1. Presumably Omega is a "well-formed" mind without any such rent-shirking spandrels.