It is clear that Eleizer advocates telling yourself things that may not actually be true.

I don't think so. He is advocating telling yourself something on the condition that telling it to yourself causes it to be true.

It's not equivalent to telling yourself "I'm attractive to the opposite sex." Say that you doubted this prior to uttering it. Then, yes, after uttering it, you might have reason to think that it is marginally more likely to be true. But you almost certainly wouldn't be justified in believing it with high confidence. That is, you still shouldn't believe the statement, so telling it to yourself is dishonest.

In contrast, Eliezer is suggesting that perhaps regularly uttering the statement

I can't get away with double-thinking! Deep down, I'll know it's not true! If I know my map has no reason to be correlated with the territory, that means I don't believe it!

does alter you so as to make itself true. If that's right, then, conditioned on your having uttered it, you are justified in believing what you uttered, so you are not being dishonest.

It's not a matter of being outside of reality. The utterance is part of reality. That's precisely why it may have the power to cause itself to be true.

Of course, it may be that this particular statement just doesn't have that power. If the probability of that were above a certain threshold, I expect that Eliezer wouldn't advocate saying it unless it's true already.