(And while we're on the subject, yes, the laws of probability theory are laws, rather than suggestions. It is like something the teacher tells you, okay? If you're going to ignore the Bayesian update you logically have to perform when you see a new piece of evidence, you might as well ignore outright mathematical proofs. I see no reason why it's any less epistemically sinful to ignore probabilities than to ignore certainties.)

Probabilities can't be ignored, of course, but nobody ever actually has the correct probabilities, except for in mathematics and experimental science. (Although in mathematics, you might say the correctness is only platonic.) When you say "probabilities" in this article, IMO, you are rather blase about interchanging the notions of these objective, accurate entities, and these nonobjective entities that get mixed up alongside of them.

The whole point of making an objective claim should be to attempt to provide evidence for why your probabilities are accurate. Thus the initial quote you mentioned about the burden of evidence is actually completely crucial and well justified, in my mind. In a situation where you can't establish this accuracy because evidence is lacking, there's really no other resort except to be skeptical, or to rely on the opinion of experts who are better able to interpret more difficult evidence.

The problem with the evolution example is that the theistic person isn't very well characterized by their skepticism. On the contrary, I would say they are more characterized by their willingness to believe, and they are a reverse-skeptic, who is unswayed by evidence but also unswayed by lack of evidence. I see much more of a problem with this kind of attitude than with the attitude of "over-skepticism" (to crudely paraphrase) that you've alluded to here.