Psychohistorian comments on The AI in a box boxes you - Less Wrong

102 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 02 February 2010 10:10AM

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Comment author: eirenicon 02 February 2010 05:31:48PM *  4 points [-]

This is not a dilemma at all. Dave should not let the AI out of the box. After all, if he's inside the box, he can't let the AI out. His decision wouldn't mean anything - it's outside-Dave's choice. And outside-Dave can't be tortured by the AI. Dave should only let the AI out if he's concerned for his copies, but honestly, that's a pretty abstract and unenforceable threat; the AI can't prove to Dave that he's doing any such thing. Besides, it's clearly unfriendly, and letting it out probably wouldn't reduce harm.

Basically, I'm outside-Dave: don't let the AI out. I'm inside-Dave: I can't let the AI out, so I won't.

[edit] To clarify: in this scenario, Dave must assume he is on the outside, because inside-Dave has no power. Inside-Dave's decisions are meaningless; he can't let the AI out, he can't keep the AI in, he can't avoid torture or cause it. Only the solitary outside-Dave's decision matters. Therefore, Dave should make the decision that ignores his copies, even though he is probably a copy.

Comment author: Psychohistorian 02 February 2010 06:10:15PM 1 point [-]

After all, if he's inside the box, he can't let the AI out. His decision wouldn't mean anything - it's outside-Dave's choice.

I think it's pretty fair to assume that there's a button or a lever or some kind of mechanism for letting the AI out, and that mechanism could be duplicated for a virtual Dave. That is, while virtual Dave pulling the lever would not release the AI, the exact same action by real Dave would release the AI. So while your decision might not mean something, it certainly could.

This, of course, is granting the assumption that the AI can credibly make such a threat, both with respect to its programmed morality and its actual capacity to simulate you, neither of which I'm sure I accept as meaningfully possible.