Vladimir_Nesov comments on A problem with Timeless Decision Theory (TDT) - Less Wrong

36 Post author: Gary_Drescher 04 February 2010 06:47PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 05 February 2010 12:30:18AM *  2 points [-]

The logical/physical distinction itself can be seen as ad-hoc: you can consider the whole set-up Q as a program that is known to you (R), because the rules of the game were explained, and also consider yourself (R) as a program known to Q. Then, Q can reason about R in interaction with various situations (that is, run, given R, but R is given as part of Q, so "given R" doesn't say anything about Q), and R can do the same with Q (and with the R within that Q, etc.). Prisoner's dilemma can also be represented in this way, even though nobody is pulling Omega in that case.

When R is considering "the past", it in fact considers facts about Q, which is known to R, and so facts about the past can be treated as "logical facts". Similarly, when these facts within Q reach R at present and interact with it, they are no more "physical facts" than anything else in this setting (these interactions with R "directed from the past" can be seen as what R predicts Q-within-R-within-Q-... to do with R-within-Q-within-R-...).