Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on A problem with Timeless Decision Theory (TDT) - Less Wrong

36 Post author: Gary_Drescher 04 February 2010 06:47PM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 05 February 2010 07:17:14AM 2 points [-]

Pearl's account doesn't include logical uncertainty at all so far as I know, but I made my case here

http://lesswrong.com/lw/15z/ingredients_of_timeless_decision_theory/

that Pearl's account has to be modified to include logical uncertainty on purely epistemic grounds, never mind decision theory.

If this isn't what you're asking about then please further clarify the question?

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 06 February 2010 09:33:17AM 4 points [-]

Treating same inputs on duplicate functions also arises in the treatment of counterfactuals (since one duplicates the causal graph across worlds of interest). The treatment I am familiar with is systematic merges of portions of the counterfactual graph which can be proved to be the same. I don't really understand why this issue is about logic (rather than about duplication).

What was confusing me, however, was the remark that it is possible to create causal graphs of mathematical facts (presumably with entailment functioning as a causal relationship between facts). I really don't see how this can be done. In particular the result is highly cyclic, infinite for most interesting theories, and it is not clear how to define interventions on such graphs in a satisfactory way.