cousin_it comments on A problem with Timeless Decision Theory (TDT) - Less Wrong

36 Post author: Gary_Drescher 04 February 2010 06:47PM

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Comment author: cousin_it 21 December 2011 11:45:36AM *  2 points [-]

Agent X is a piece of paper with "Defect" written on it.

Sorry, was this intended as part of the problem statement, like "Omega tells you that agent X is a DefectBot that will play the same as you"? If yes, then ok. But if we don't know what agent X is, then I don't understand why a DefectBot is apriori more probable than a CooperateBot. If they are equally probable, then it cancels out (edit: no it doesn't, it actually makes cooperating a better choice, thx ArisKatsaris). And there's also the case where X is a copy of you, where cooperating does help. So it seems to be a better choice overall.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 21 December 2011 11:55:13AM *  1 point [-]

But there's also the case where X is a copy of you, where cooperating does help, so it seems to be a better choice overall.

There is also a case where X is an anticopy (performs opposite action), which argues for defecting in the same manner.

Edit: This reply is wrong.

Comment author: cousin_it 21 December 2011 11:56:35AM 2 points [-]

There is also a case where X is an anticopy (performs opposite action), which argues for defecting in the same manner.

No it doesn't. If X is an anticopy, the situation can't be real and your action doesn't matter.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 21 December 2011 12:03:11PM 1 point [-]

Why can't it be real?

Comment author: cousin_it 21 December 2011 12:03:52PM 2 points [-]

Because Omega has told you that X's action is the same as yours.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 21 December 2011 12:06:11PM 2 points [-]

OK.