SilasBarta comments on Epistemic Luck - Less Wrong
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Right, it doesn't. But they're still going to be inferentially connected (d-connected in Judea Pearl's terminology) because both a) your beliefs (if formed through a reliable process), and b) philosophical truths, will be caused by the same source.
And just a terminology issue: I was being a bit sloppy here, I admit. "X causes Y", in the sense I was using it, means "the state of X is a cause of the state of Y". So it would be technically correct but confusing to say, "Eating unhealthy foods causes long life", because it means "Whether you eat unhealthy foods is a causal factor in whether you have a long life".
Yes, I assumed that how philosophers define the terms, but a) I don't find such a category useful because b) of all the instances where philosophers had to revise their first-principles derivations based on subtle assumptions about how the universe works.
I actually agree. Still, to the extent that they do converge on reliable truth finding mechanisms, they should converge on the same truth-finding mechanisms. And one's admission that one's own truth-finding mechanism is so heavily school-dependent would indeed be quite worrisome, as it indicates insufficient critical analysis of what one was taught.
Of course, merely being critical is insufficient (someone who said so in this discussion was rightfully modded down for such a simplistic solution). I would say that you additionally have to check that the things you learn are multiply and deeply connected to the rest of your model of the world, and not just some "dangling node", immune to the onslaught of evidence from other fields.
This sounds like a metaphysics-epistemology confusion (or 'territory-map confusion', as folks around here might call it). It's true that empirical information can cause us to revise our 'a priori' beliefs. (Most obviously, looking at reality can be a useful corrective for failures of imagination.) But it doesn't follow that the propositions themselves are contingent.
Indeed, it's easy to prove that there are necessary truths: just conditionalize out the contingencies, until you reach bedrock. That is, take some contingent truth P, and some complete description of C of the circumstances in which P would be true. Then the conditional "if C then P" is itself non-contingent.
Not sure how this engages with my challenge. The idea is that different schools might not all be converging on "reliable truth finding mechanisms". Maybe only one is, and the rest are like (non-obvious) cults, in respect of their (non-obvious) unreliability. [I'm not suggesting that this is actually the case, but just that it's a possibility that we need to consider, in order to tighten the arguments being presented here.] As the cult analogy shows, the contingency of our beliefs on our educational environment does not entail "insufficiently critical analysis of what one was taught". So I'm wanting you guys to fill in the missing premises.