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ciphergoth comments on Shut Up and Divide? - Less Wrong
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Comments (258)
Is there a case to be made that this is an efficient way to give, compared to eg GiveWell's recommendations?
That's a different question. Perhaps a different rationalization: "No, I'm not going to give $10 to the Knox defense fund, because it wouldn't make much of a difference."
One idea that I'm struggling to express (or perhas refute, if it's just a misconception of mine) is that investing effort in an area where someone else is likely to invest a countervailing effort may be less effective than investing in an area where you meet no opposing force.
Suppose, for instance, that a $10 donation to the Amanda Knox fund is somewhat likely to be matched by a $10 donation from someone else to a "justice for Meredith Kercher" fund. Then you may want to look instead for a way to use the same amount of money to improve the judicial system so that future occurrences are made less likely. Or on improving education in general, to raise the world's sanity level.
The prosecution of Knox is funded by the involuntary contributions of Italian taxpayers; the defense fund itself helps to provide (a small measure of) support against an already formidable opposing force.
I hear you. Yet, what I'm trying to express seems to make some intuitive sense, and I'd appreciate help in spotting whatever might be wrong with it.
Think of it in game theoretic terms: you have 10 points to can allocate between games A and B. Game A is a winner-take-all scenario, and your opponent has allocated 1000 points; the payoff is P. Game B is a percentage-return scenario; the payoff to each player is proportional to the amount they allocated (perhaps in much smaller proportion). In game A as in game B, your allocation may be aggregated with that of other players, but you are uncertain of how many are playing.
It seems to me that, depending on P and on your probability assignments for how many other players you're likely to be cooperating with in game A, it can be rational to choose to pass up game A altogether.
(Having expressed it that way, it seems somewhat similar to the "should I vote" question, as in "I should only vote if it's likely that my vote is the one that will tip the scales.")
Not a good one, as far as I can tell. Hundreds of thousands in legal fees, etc, could save hundreds of African lives.
See my comment.
It was explicitly proposed as a form of warm-fuzzy giving, not as an efficient purchase of utilons.
Of course, for the specific purpose of helping Amanda and her family, it's the most efficient way of giving I know of.
When I want to buy fuzzies, I am nice to my friends or by tuna for the cats. When it comes to spending on benefiting strangers, I can't see why I'd want to choose an inefficient way over an efficient way. But your mileage may vary.
If you don't sympathize with Amanda enough that helping her would give you a fuzzy feeling, then obviously it's not a good use of your money (from your perspective).
Rather, if my sympathy for her is not at least two orders of magnitude greater than it is for unknown Africans. I don't mean that to sound moralistic - my sympathy for my cats really is greater, awful as that sounds.
For me, helping unknown Africans generally comes out of the utility budget, rather than the fuzzy budget. You may be different.
In any case, yes, it's a question of amount-of-fuzziness per unit-of-money donated.