I was just trying to clarify my interpretation of what you're saying. Because if they are theorizing of Xhi, if there are facts about Xhi and if they are seeking knowledge of it it seems clear that they ought to be doing science (in the general epistemological sense I was using earlier) to form these theories and discover these facts. This of course does not demonstrate that the two magesteria, as you've formulated them, are incoherent.

But I'm not sure if you are talking about the same thing Gould (and presumably Eliezer) are talking about. I took Gould to be saying that this second magesterium isn't just a subject or set of subjects about which our particular scientific facts and scientific principles can say nothing. Rather, I believe Gould is saying that the magesterium of faith consists of areas of thought or subjects for which the scientific community, the scientific method and inductive empiricism itself cease to apply. Moreover, they don't only not apply because we've chosen a way of seeing these areas of thought that doesn't involve scientific epistemology, they don't apply as a matter of principle-- it is a category error to try and apply the tools of science to the domain of religion.

Edit: And like I said: that looks like nonsense to me.