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wnoise comments on What is Bayesianism? - Less Wrong

81 Post author: Kaj_Sotala 26 February 2010 07:43AM

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Comment author: wnoise 27 February 2010 01:55:12AM *  6 points [-]

The frequentist can account for these things, in various ways.

Oh, absolutely. The typical way is choosing some reference class of idealized experiments that could be done. Of course, the right choice of reference class is just as arbitrary as the right choice of Bayesian prior.

My preferred reply would be that the 50/50 is a property of the symmetry of the coin.

Whereas the Bayesian would argue that the 50/50 property is a symmetry about our knowledge of the coin -- even a coin that you know is biased, but that you have no evidence for which way it is biased.

I understand that Bayesian's don't tend to abstract things to their idealized forms

Well, I don't think Bayesians are particularly reluctant to look at idealized forms, it's just that when you can make your model more closely match the situation (without incurring horrendous calculational difficulties) there is a benefit to do so.

And of course, the question is "which idealized form?" There are many ways to idealize almost any situation, and I think talking about "the" idealized form can be misleading. Talking about a "fair coin" is already a serious abstraction and idealization, but it's one that has, of course, proven quite useful.

I wonder to what extent Frequentism does this necessarily. (What is the relationship between Frequentism and Platonism?)

That's a very interesting question.