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laakeus comments on Improving The Akrasia Hypothesis - Less Wrong
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No. ;-)
More precisely, I would say that agency is an unnecessary hypothesis, and postulating agency seems to lead people to certain predictable failure patterns (like treating parts of the self as an enemy, or one's self as the victim of these agents, trying to negotiate with them, and other anthropomorphic overkill).
I only restricted the present discussion to "motor" programs to limit distracting digressions on the topic of higher-level cognitive architecture. For modeling akrasia, it's simply sufficient to assume that various programs can be activated in parallel, and that one of consciousness's functions is to manage conflict between activated programs.
For a specific example of motor programs, see this other comment.
I like this way of putting it.
It maybe more useful in practice too, but like Rodolfo Llinás hypothesizes: all we can do, as humans, is to activate motor neurons. So thinking is fundamentally just internalized movement.