The post and comments -- all very interesting so far -- tend to assume that a rationalist's goal in conversation with someone else is always a first-order one, where success and failure are represented only by whether the interlocutor changes his/her mind with respect to rationality or truth-seeking. There might be a limited category of cases where this assumption isn't good.
For example, if there were a young-earth creationist who was also a fourth-grade teacher, and who was in the habit of subtly undermining scientific truth with talk of "controversies" and the like, I think we could assume that he was erecting serious roadblocks to his students' future progress as rationalists. (I think I need not spell out the ways in which that might be true.) Now suppose I were able to persuade him that something like evolution by natural selection took place, even if I did so by some fundamentally dishonest means (by citing certain Bible verses, say), and in a way that led to no increase in his overall ability to think rationally about anything. If the result were that he kept his damn mouth shut about bogus scientific controversies in the presence of impressionable children, thereby not impeding their future progress as rationalists, the broad cause of rationality might well have been helped along.
Generalizing a bit, it seems rarely preferable to allow someone to continue believing something false that they have no justification for, instead of convincing them to believe something true that they have no justification for, in cases where -- as the OP seems to suggest -- those are the only two realistic options. To say we must never consider using some "dark arts" in the service of rationality at a level or two of remove seems somehow ... deontologist.
Now suppose I were able to persuade him that something like evolution by natural selection took place, even if I did so by some fundamentally dishonest means (by citing certain Bible verses, say), and in a way that led to no increase in his overall ability to think rationally about anything. If the result were that he kept his damn mouth shut about bogus scientific controversies in the presence of impressionable children, thereby not impeding their future progress as rationalists, the broad cause of rationality might well have been helped along.
If, on t...
The product of Less Wrong is truth. However, there seems to be a reluctance of the personality types here - myself included - to sell that product. Here's my evidence:
We actually label many highly effective persuasive strategies that can be used to market our true ideas as "dark arts". What's the justification for this negative branding? A necessary evil is not evil. Even if - and this is a huge if - our future utopia is free of dark arts, that's not the world we live in today. Choosing not to use them is analogous to a peacenik wanting to rid the world of violence by suggesting that police not use weapons.
We treat our dislike of dark arts as if it's a simple corollary of the axiom of the virtue of truth. Does this mean we assume the ends (more people believe the truth) doesn't justify the means (persuasion to the truth via exploiting cognitive biases)? Or are we just worried about being hypocrites? Whatever the reason, such an impactful assumption deserves an explanation. Speaking practically, the successful practice of dark arts requires the psychological skill of switching hats, to use Edward de Bono's terminology. While posting on Less Wrong, we can avoid and are in fact praised for avoiding dark arts, but we need to switch up in other environments, and that's difficult. Frankly, we're not great at it, and it's very tempting to externalize the problem and say "the art is bad" rather than "we're bad at the art".
Our distaste for rhetorical tactics, both aesthetically and morally, profoundly affects the way we communicate. That distaste is tightly coupled with the mental habit of always interpreting the value of what is said purely for its informational content, logical consistency, and insight. I'm basing the following question on my own introspection, but I wonder if this almost religiously entrenched mental habit could make us blind to the value of the art of persuasion? Let's imagine for a moment, the most convincing paragraph ever written. It was truly a world-wonder of persuasion - it converted fundamentalist Christians into atheists, suicide bombers into diplomats, and Ann Coulter-4-President supporters into Less Wrong sycophants. What would your reaction to the paragraph be? Would you "up-vote" this work of genius? No way. We'd be competing to tell the fundamentalist Christian that there were at least three argument fallacies in the first sentence, we'd explain to the suicide bomber that the rhetoric could be used equally well to justify blowing us all up right now, and for completeness we'd give the Ann Coulter supporter a brief overview of Bayesianism.