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prase comments on The Blackmail Equation - Less Wrong
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There is no "first" in precommiting -- your source code precommits you to certain actions, and you can't influence your source code, only carry out what the code states. The notion of precommiting, as a modification, is bogus (not so for the signalling of being precommited, or of being precommited in the particular case). You could be precommited to ignore certain signals of precommitment as well, and at some point signal such a precommitment. There seems to be no sense in distinguishing between when the same signal of precommitment is made (but it should be about the same precommitment, not a conditional variant of the previous one).
By precommiting I understand starting to be aware of the fact that my source code will do the particular thing with certainty. Nobody knows his source code completely, and even knowing the source code doesn't imply knowing all its outputs immediately. So, what I wanted to say is that when making the threat, the baron must know that he will certainly act the way he announces (this is the precommitment) and the countess has to know this fact about the baron (this is the signalling part).
Time matters because the baron has to calculate his counterfactual actions (i.e. partly simulate himself) before he can precommit in the sense I understand the word.