gwern comments on Blackmail, Nukes and the Prisoner's Dilemma - Less Wrong

20 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 10 March 2010 02:58PM

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Tags: decision_theory newcomblike decision winning meta rationality cooperation logic coordination

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Comment author: MichaelHoward 10 March 2010 09:37:17PM 3 points [-]

The most interesting of his tactics is the following:

  • (Countess C, Countess D, Countess N) -> (Baron D, Baron N, Baron N) : "Nuclear blackmail"

This is more interesting. It also results in Epic Win for the Baron...

  • (Countess C, Countess D, Countess N) -> (Baron D, Baron N, Baron C) : "Please nuke me"
Comment author: gwern 22 September 2010 09:59:26PM 1 point [-]

I don't understand the difference. 'Please nuke me' and 'nuclear blackmail' seem to be identical except the baron Cooperates if the Countess Nukes in the 'Please' scenario - but cooperation has the same payoff as the Baron nuking right back.

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