PhilGoetz comments on Human values differ as much as values can differ - Less Wrong
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The problem of value aggregation has at least one obvious lower bound: divide the universe on equal parts, and have each part optimized to given person's preference, including game-theoretic trade between the parts to take into account preferences of each of the parts for the structure of the other parts. Even if values of each person have little in common, this would be a great improvement over status quo.
This lower-bound could have some use; but my view is that, in the future, most people will be elements of bigger people, making this division difficult.
Existing societies are constructed in a way so that optimizing each person's preference can help optimize the society's preference. So maybe it's possible.
I think the idea is to divide between current people('s individual extrapolated goal systems) once and for all time, in which case this poses no problem as long as personal identity isn't significantly blurred between now and FAI.