click Ok, I think I see now. Forgive me for asking instead of trying to figure this out on my own - finals are looming tomorrow. Morning. And the next morning.

One of two things seem to be going on here. I'll quote Eliezer's metaethical position again, for reference (answering what the meaning of "right" is):

For a human this is a much huger blob of a computation that looks like, "Did everyone survive? How many people are happy? Are people in control of their own lives? ..." Humans have complex emotions, have many values - the thousand shards of desire, the godshatter of natural selection. I would say, by the way, that the huge blob of a computation is not just my present terminal values (which I don't really have - I am not a consistent expected utility maximizers); the huge blob of a computation includes the specification of those moral arguments, those justifications, that would sway me if I heard them. So that I can regard my present values, as an approximation to the ideal morality that I would have if I heard all the arguments, to whatever extent such an extrapolation is coherent.

The bolded part is most relevant to my question. Are you agreeing with Eleizer's argument, and just arguing that present terminal values can only be inferred from action? Or are you disagreeing and arguing that present terminal values, which only can be inferred from action, are the terminal values, i.e. the meaning of "right"/"should"? Or is it something else and I'm still confused?