byrnema comments on Open Thread: March 2010, part 3 - Less Wrong

3 Post author: RobinZ 19 March 2010 03:14AM

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Comment author: JGWeissman 31 March 2010 01:51:04AM 1 point [-]

I have no preferences within the class of states of the universe that do not, and cannot evolve to, contain consciousness.

But if, for example, I was put in this situation by a cheesecake maximizer, I would choose something other than cheese cake.

Comment author: byrnema 01 April 2010 12:47:25PM *  0 points [-]

I can't recall: do your views on consciousness have a dualist component? If consciousness is in some way transcendental (that is, as a whole somehow independent or outside of the material parts), then I understand valuing it as, for example, something that has interesting or unique potential.

If you are not dualistic about consciousness, could you describe why you value it more than cheesecake?

Comment author: JGWeissman 02 April 2010 01:17:42AM 0 points [-]

No, I am not a dualist.

If you are not dualistic about consciousness, could you describe why you value it more than cheesecake?

To be precise, I value positive conscious experience more than cheesecake, and negative conscious experience less than cheesecake.

I assign value to things according to how they are experienced, and consciousness is required for this experience. This has to do with the abstract properties of conscious experience, and not with how it is implemented, whether by mathematical structure of physical arrangements, or by ontologically basic consciousness.