Your comment has induced me to reread the thread, which leads me to believe we've been talking past each other to some extent. That said, I think we still disagree in two places.

First, I disagree with this:

It seems that many physicalists here are putting up semantic stopsigns to compensate for the fact that they don't really have an explanation yet.

and, second, I deny the implications of this:

[...] why are so many of you bothered by the claim that conscious experience may in fact be a basic physical phenomenon?

Let me highlight two claims that I would make which drive this disagreement:

1. The present state of evidence strongly suggests (p > 0.99)* that consciousness, like combustion, is a high-level phenomenon which, in theory, can be completely described by an explanation not in terms of consciousness.

2. The overwhelming majority of physicalists active on LessWrong deny that "emergence" is a sufficient explanation of consciousness.

Please let me know if you disagree with either or both, or if there is some other significant claim on which we disagree, and we can resume from there.

* If you wish to claim that I am understating the strength of the evidence, at least grant that I am not overstating it.

"Emergent" explanations of consciousness do not do this: they place subjective experience at the wrong level and postulate extremely complex bridging laws as a result.

No they don't; 'bridging laws' are only necessary if you're some sort of dualist. Regular, nonmysterious emergence doesn't require any special laws at all, just like you don't need any extra rules to get gliders from Conway's game of life.