Vladimir_Nesov comments on Maximise Expected Utility, not Expected Perception of Utility - Less Wrong

12 Post author: JGWeissman 26 March 2010 04:39AM

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Comment author: PhilGoetz 08 May 2010 02:14:24PM 1 point [-]

This agent is not a very effective optimization process. It would rather falsely believe that it has achieved its goals than actually achieve its goals.

If it's an AI, and it has the predicate 'goal(foo(bar))', and the semantics of its knowledge representation are that the presence of 'foo(bar)' in its knowledge base means "I believe foo(bar)" (which is the usual way of doing it), then anything that writes 'foo(bar)' into its knowledge base achieves its goals.

The typical AI representational system has no way to distinguish a true fact from a believed fact. There's no reason to make such a distinction; it would be misleading.

You're going astray when you say,

Suppose the agent has the opportunity (option A) to arrange to falsely believe the universe is in a state that is worth utility uFA but this action really leads to a different state worth utility uTA,

A rational agent can't detect the existence of option A. It would have to both infer that A leads to utility uTA, and at the same time infer that it leads to uFA.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 May 2010 02:28:56PM 2 points [-]

If it's an AI, and it has the predicate 'goal(foo(bar))', and the semantics of its knowledge representation are that the presence of 'foo(bar)' in its knowledge base means "I believe foo(bar)" (which is the usual way of doing it), then anything that writes 'foo(bar)' into its knowledge base achieves its goals.

Nope. One shouldn't conclude from Theorem(I'll answer "42") that the answer should be "42". There is a difference between believing you believe something, and believing it. Believing something is enough to believe you believe it, but not conversely. Only from outside the system can you make that step, looking at the system and pointing out that if it believes something, and it really did do everything correctly, then it must be true.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 08 May 2010 02:39:40PM 0 points [-]

I am speaking of simple, straightforward, representational semantics of a logic, and the answer I gave is correct. You are talking about humans, and making a sophisticated philosophical argument, and trying to map it onto logic by analogy. Which is more reliable?

I don't mean that your comments are wrong; but you're talking about people, and I'm talking about computer programs. What I said about computer programs is correct about computer programs.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 May 2010 02:57:42PM *  1 point [-]

As was indicated by the link, I'm talking about Loeb's theorem; the informal discussion about what people (or formal agents) should believe is merely one application/illustration of that idea.