Academian comments on Newcomb's problem happened to me - Less Wrong

37 Post author: Academian 26 March 2010 06:31PM

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Tags: newcomblike kavka causal timeless decision theory

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Comment author: Academian 26 March 2010 07:30:44PM *  1 point [-]

My pre-sponse to this is in footnote 2:

If you care about "causal reasoning", the other half of what's supposed to make Newcomb confusing, then Joe's problem is more like Kavka's (so this post accidentally shows how Kavka and Newcomb are similar). But the distinction is instrumentally irrelevant: the point is that he can benefit from decision mechanisms that are evidential and time-invariant, and you don't need "unreasonable certainties" or "paradoxes of causality" for this to come up.

Comment author: taw 26 March 2010 07:47:06PM 0 points [-]

There is no need for time-invariance. The most generic model (2 Joe nodes; 1 Kate note; 3 Nature nodes) of vanilla decision theory perfectly explains the situation you're talking about - unless you postulate some causal loops.

Comment author: Academian 26 March 2010 07:51:43PM *  0 points [-]

Joe's problem is more like Kavka's (so this post accidentally shows how Kavka and Newcomb are similar)

Is that not the simplicity you're interested in?

Comment author: taw 26 March 2010 08:04:06PM -1 points [-]

And in Kavka's problem there's no paradox unless we assume causal loops (billionaire knows now if you're going to decide to drink the toxin or not tomorrow), or leave the problem ambiguous (so can you change or mind or not?).

Comment author: Academian 26 March 2010 08:12:56PM 3 points [-]

You'll notice I didn't once use the word "paradox" ;)

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