PhilGoetz comments on Newcomb's problem happened to me - Less Wrong

37 Post author: Academian 26 March 2010 06:31PM

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Comment author: taw 26 March 2010 07:09:12PM -1 points [-]

If precommitment is observable and unchangeable, then order of action is:

  • Joe: precommit or not
  • Kate: accept or not - knowing if Joe precommitted or not
  • Joe: breakup (assuming no precommitment)

If precommitment is not observable and/or changeable, then it can be rearranged, and we have:

  • Kate: accept or not - not having any clue what Joe did
  • Joe: breakup or not

Or in the most complex situation, with 3 probabilistic nodes:

  • Joe: precommit or not
  • Nature: Kate figures out what Joe did correctly or not
  • Kate: accept or not
  • Nature: Marriage happy or unhappy
  • Nature: Joe changes mind or not
  • Joe: breakup or not

None of these is remotely Newcombish. You only get Newcomb paradox when you assume causal loop, and try to solve the problem using tools devised for situations without causal loops.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 26 March 2010 08:45:56PM *  4 points [-]

If Joe believes that his precommitment is inviolable, or even that it affects the probability of him breaking up later, then it appears to him that he is confronted with a causal loop. His decision-making program, at that moment, addresses Newcomb's problem, even if it's wrong in believing in the causal loop.

But I think this only proves that flawed reasoners may face Newcomb's problem. (It might even turn out that finding yourself facing Newcomb's problem proves your reasoning is flawed.)

It's still interesting enough to up-vote.