PhilGoetz comments on It's not like anything to be a bat - Less Wrong

15 Post author: Yvain 27 March 2010 02:32PM

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Comment author: PhilGoetz 28 March 2010 12:29:08AM 7 points [-]

Can't I use the same reasoning to prove that non-Americans aren't conscious?

Comment author: JGWeissman 28 March 2010 12:52:58AM 2 points [-]

The anthropic principal only provides between 4 and 5 bits of evidence for this this theory, not nearly enough to support the complexity of the same brain structures being conscious in Americans but not in non-Americans.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 28 March 2010 12:58:09AM 13 points [-]

All right, then. I got 33 bits that says everyone except me is unconscious!

Comment author: bogus comment score below threshold [+] (14 children)

Comment author: PhilGoetz 28 March 2010 04:02:59PM 2 points [-]

If the quantum mind hypothesis is false, then either subjective experience doesn't exist at all (which anyone who's reading this post ought to take as an empirically false statement) or solipsism is true and only a single subjective experience exists.

Why's that?

Comment author: bogus 28 March 2010 04:16:50PM -2 points [-]

Why's that?

Because "I am my brain" is actually an extremely complex hypothesis; you need to relate all of your inner subjective experience to brain states, action potentials, firing patterns and what not. Since all brains are actually slightly different from one another (at least from a purely physical point of view), the hypothesis that other brains also have subjective experience is untenable due to its sheer complexity.

Comment author: [deleted] 28 March 2010 07:12:55PM 4 points [-]

That's like saying that "there is a prime number greater than 3^^^3" is an extremely complex and therefore untenable hypothesis, because such a number needs to be coprime to all of the natural numbers below it.

Every possible way to realize the hypothesis "I am my brain" is extremely unlikely, but there are extremely many ways to realize it. A disjunction of lots of unlikely things need not be unlikely.

Comment author: bogus 28 March 2010 08:30:12PM * 0 points [-]

Every possible way to realize the hypothesis "I am my brain" is extremely unlikely, but there are extremely many ways to realize it.

No, there aren't. The physical state of your brain is known, and (assuming physicalism/epiphenomenalism/property dualism is true) the physical state must explain everything you might claim about your subjective experience. Either you're a p-zombie and do not actually have subjective experience, or this explanation must be evaluated for simplicity on Occam's razor/Solomonoff induction grounds.

Comment author: [deleted] 29 March 2010 02:31:37AM 1 point [-]

You've managed to confuse me. I suspect, though, that this analogy is relevant:

What is the probability that the text between the quotation marks in this paragraph is "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Fusce id velit urna, ac sollicitudin libero. Phasellus ac rutrum nisl. In volutpat scelerisque justo, non congue diam vestibulum sit amet. Donec."? The prior probability of this being true is minuscule, looking something like 10^-60; therefore, you might as well rule it out now.

On the other hand, I suspect that we don't actually disagree at all. After all, you seem to be arguing for a position I agree with; I'm simply not sure whether you're arguing correctly or not.

Comment author: wedrifid 29 March 2010 11:40:27AM 1 point [-]

What is the probability that the text between the quotation marks in this paragraph is "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Fusce id velit urna, ac sollicitudin libero. Phasellus ac rutrum nisl. In volutpat scelerisque justo, non congue diam vestibulum sit amet. Donec."? The prior probability of this being true is minuscule, looking something like 10^-60; therefore, you might as well rule it out now.

Prior to what exactly? I do have a prior for "a randomly generated ascii string of that particular length being the same as the string given". I wouldn't be able to know to use that as the prior unless I have already been given some information. Then there is all the knowledge of human languages and cultural idiosyncracies I happen to have. Which of those am I allowed to consider? It's hard to tell since, well, you've alreay given me the answer. It's a bit post for any 'prior' except meta-uncertainty. I would need a specific counter-factual state of knowledge to be able to give a reasonable prior.

(All of which I believe supports your point.)

Comment author: bogus 29 March 2010 01:09:35PM 0 points [-]

This seems to be a case of extraordinary claims are extraordinary evidence. It's like saying, "well yes, the fact that I have a brain is pretty extraordinary, but so what? I clearly have one". It doesn't distinguish between a Boltzmann brain and a brain arising normally via natural selection. So is your consciousness a Boltzmann consciousness?

Comment author: PhilGoetz 28 March 2010 04:45:51PM 2 points [-]

Since all brains are actually slightly different from one another (at least from a purely physical point of view), the hypothesis that other brains also have subjective experience is untenable due to its sheer complexity.

I don't see any justification for the connecting "since".

Comment author: bogus 28 March 2010 05:58:36PM -1 points [-]

You believe that a single mapping between physical brains and subjective experiences can apply to all humans? What does this mapping look like? How many bits are needed to fully specify it?

Comment author: Nick_Tarleton 28 March 2010 07:06:54PM * 2 points [-]

Is it reasonable to expect me to necessarily be able to answer that question if materialism is true?

(What does the mapping from entangled quantum states to experiences look like?)

Comment author: bogus 28 March 2010 07:37:26PM -2 points [-]

Is it reasonable to expect me to necessarily be able to answer that question if materialism is true?

It's about as reasonable as demanding an account of how the brain can mantain mesoscopic quantum superpositions long enough to influence neural processes.

(What does the mapping from entangled quantum states to experiences look like?)

We don't know, but it's going to be far simpler than a mapping from classical brains.

(For all we know, it could be trivial; perhaps each quale is a GENSYM which maps directly to a basis of the quantum system.)

Comment author: Morendil 28 March 2010 04:18:03PM 0 points [-]

What does that have to do with the quantum mind hypothesis?

Comment author: bogus 28 March 2010 04:29:44PM -1 points [-]

That allows you to replace "I am my brain" with "I am a complex quantum state which is instantiated by my brain; and my inner experience maps directly to this quantum state." Other brains have evolved to maintain quantum states in the same way, hence they also have subjective experience.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 28 March 2010 04:44:54PM 2 points [-]

That doesn't make a difference wrt your argument.

Comment author: Yvain 28 March 2010 01:37:41PM 0 points [-]

Not unless you have a strong reason to privilege the state of being an American as especially interesting. Otherwise, you're in the position Jordan mentioned of just knowing you're in one unexceptional condition out of many.

One thing you could say based on your being an American is that you have weak evidence that America is likely to be one of the more populous countries, and strong evidence that there's no country thousands or billions of times more populous than America. Both conclusions are correct.

And further, if a Luxembourgian posts a reply here saying "My Luxembourgian citizenship disproves the anthropic principle", that doesn't count, because you're not him and he's self-selected by posting here o_O

Comment author: rwallace 28 March 2010 03:21:56PM 1 point [-]

So we seem to have concluded that my Irish citizenship disproves the anthropic principle, and I can know this, but you cannot know it :-)

Comment author: Yvain 28 March 2010 04:08:48PM * 2 points [-]

As a matter of fact, I live in Ireland (although I'm a US citizen). That coincidence probably disproves some sort of important principle right there.

I think you've mentioned before that you live in Dublin; I live in Cork, so sadly we're a little too far to meet up for a chat one night.

Comment author: rwallace 28 March 2010 06:16:12PM 0 points [-]

It probably does :-)

Yeah, a little too far, but let me know if you're going to be in Dublin at any stage, and I'll do likewise if I'm going to be in Cork.

PhilGoetz comments on It's not like anything to be a bat - Less Wrong

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