= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
wedrifid comments on The I-Less Eye - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (83)
Yes, yes he did, time and again (substituting "copy" for "zombie", as MP points out below). That's the Star Trek paradox.
Imagine that there is a glitch in the system, so that the "original" Kirk fails to dematerialise when the "new" one appears, so we find ourselves with two copies of Kirk. Now Scotty says "Sowwy Captain" and zaps the "old" Kirk into a cloud of atoms. How in the world does that not constitute murder?
That was not the paradox. The "paradox" is this: the only difference between "innocuous" teleportation, and the murder scenario described above, is a small time-shift of a few seconds. If Kirk1 disappears a few seconds before Kirk2 appears, we have no problem with that. We even show it repeatedly in programmes aimed at children. But when Kirk1 disappears a few seconds after Kirk2 appears, all of a sudden we see the act for what it is, namely murder.
How is it that a mere shift of a few seconds causes such a great difference in our perception? How is it that we can immediately see the murder in the second case, but that the first case seems so innocent to us? This stark contrast between our intuitive perceptions of the two cases, despite their apparent underlying similarity, constitutes the paradox.
And yes, it seems likely that the above also holds when a single person is made absolutely unconscious (flat EEG) and then awakened. Intuitively, we feel that the same person, the same identity, has persisted throughout this interruption; but when we think of the Star Trek paradox, and if we assume (as good materialists) that consciousness is the outcome of physical brain activity, we realise that this situation is not very different from that of Kirk1 and Kirk2. More generally, it illustrates the problems associated with assuming that you "are" the same person that you were just one minute ago (for some concepts of "are").
I was thinking of writing a post about this, but apparently all of the above seems to be ridiculously obvious to most LWers, so I guess there's not much of a point. I still find it pretty fascinating. What can I say, I'm easily impressed.
I'm not comfortable with 'for what it is, namely'. I would be comfortable with 'see the act as murder'. I don't play 'moral reference class tennis'. Killing a foetus before it is born is killing a foetus before it is born (or abortion). Creating a copy then removing the original is creating a copy and then removing the original (or teleportation). Killing someone who wants to die is killing someone who wants to die (or euthanasia). Calling any of these things murder is not necessarily wrong but it is not a factual judgement it is a moral judgement. The speaker wants people to have the same kind of reaction that they have to other acts that are called 'murder'.
'Murder' is just more complex than that. So is 'killing' and so is 'identity'. You can simplify the concepts arbitrarily so that 'identity' is a property of a specific combination of matter if you want to but that just means you need to make up a new word to describe "that thing that looks, talks and acts like the same Kirk every episode and doesn't care at all that he gets de-materialised all the time". If you don't keep a separate word to describe that concept then you will end up making some extremely silly life choices when you come to be exposed to choices outside of the cultural norm. Like Cryonics. Depending on how many exceptions you want to allow yourself you'll also need to be careful about blood transfusions, shedding skin, neurogenesis over time, definitely organ transplants.
For my part I feel comfortable obliterating the atomic structure of my body and having it recreated perfectly on the surface of a planet. I wouldn't be comfortable with being conscious in the 'obliteration' process but I don't care at all whether the copy is created before or after the original is destroyed. No, scratch that, I do care. I want the original destroyed after the copy is created so it can double check it has it right first! I care about my 'pattern' rather a lot more than my 'originality' so if "identity" means 'the original substance' then I jolly well want a new word that means 'me'!
It doesn't and I don't. See above. (ie. Replace 'our' with 'my'?) That just isn't how my intuition is wired. I actually feel a little nervous about there not being a copy of me outside of the Enterprise's RAM. Although I suppose I would adjust to that once people explain "it's safer than driving in your car, no really!".