Same questions, new formulation.
It seems that here at Less Wrong, we discourage map/territory discrepancies and mind projection fallacies, etc.
However, "winning" is in the map not the territory.
In one extreme aesthetic, we could become agents that have no subjective beliefs about the territory. But then there would be no "winning"; we'd have to give up on that.
So instead we'd like to have our set of beliefs minimally include enough non-objectively-true stuff to make "winning" coherent. Given this, how can we draw a line about which beliefs are good to have? For example, we certainly don't want to have beliefs that are objectively false. But what about the entire set of beliefs that are objectively neither true nor false? Are they all equivalent? Is there any way to define an aesthetic for choosing from this set of beliefs?
I think physical materialism tries 'minimalism' as an aesthetic and fails, because there is a continuous trade-off between fewer and fewer beliefs and a less well-defined sense of "win"; there seems no natural place to make a break.
Instead you could choose beliefs that maximize the sense of winning, and that is what theists do.
Our sense of "winning" isn't entirely up for grabs: we prefer sensory stimulation to its absence, we prefer novel stimulations to boring old ones, we prefer to avoid protracted pain, we generally prefer living in human company rather than on desert islands, and so on.
In one manner of thinking, our sense of "winning" - considered as a set of statistically reliable facts about human beings - is definitely part of the territory. It's a set of facts about human brains.
"Winning" more reliably entails accumulating knowledge about wh...
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