I'm quite familiar with these arguments. I'm not sure why you'd suppose I wasn't.

The decision of guilt or innocence is delegated to the jury in an attempt to avoid conflicts of interest. Because of the requirement for the judge to be an expert on the law it must be a long term position and so the judge would be an obvious target for bribery or intimidation and will be prone to conflicts of interest when deciding verdicts where the state's interests are opposed to a private citizen's.

First, my claim is that determining matters of fact also requires a kind of expertise. Second, I'm generally skeptical about the extent to which an adversarial system protects judges from conflicts of interests, bribes and intimidation more than an inquisitorial system. Even in adversarial systems judges exercise a lot of control and are bribed and intimidated on a regular basis. Lots of liberal democracies have inquisitorial systems and aren't especially notorious for coerced or biased judges. Is there evidence that civil systems lead to more bribery? Third, this fear of judges siding with "the state" against private citizens can be (and is) remedied by checks and balances elsewhere (like the kind all liberal societies already have) and mechanisms to allow the public to fire judges. Fourth, what conflicts of interest aren't avoidable with oversight in an inquistorial system that are avoidable in a adversarial system?

I don't think a fair, rational system should include anything like jury nullification.

The results are not perfect but understanding why such systems developed as they did is an essential prerequisite to any consideration of possible improvements.

"The results are not perfect" considerably understates the problems, methinks.