bentarm comments on Eight Short Studies On Excuses - Less Wrong
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Sounds like a weak precomittment. Schelling includes the theory of excuses in his work, and they are a key part of bargaining, since pre-commitments that can be averted without appearing to weaken the bargainer's position will be.
IOW, once a breach has been made it will be in both parties' interests not to have the threat carried out, and any "wiggle room" in the precommitment will be exploited. Because of this, bargainers are well-advised to make the circumstances that will trigger their threat as unambiguous and externally verifiable as possible.
I don't see any way to do this with your model precommitment, unless the agent(s) you're bargaining with and any third parties observing have access to your source code.
If typing an abbreviation saves you less than 10 keystrokes, but increases the time taken to parse your post by at least 30 seconds for at least one reader, it almost certainly isn't socially optimal to use it (although I did get the pleasure of an 'aha' moment when I finally figured out what 'IOW' was supposed to mean).
IOW is such a common abbreviation online that it actually INCREASED my speed of parsing the post.
And I suspect, if you encounter it in future, you may eventually find it to save you time also. IOW, "IOW" may actually be socially optimal in many contexts, even if some people don't understand it.
Much like using the abbreviation FAI.
You both managed to have this discussion without actually saying that IOW should be parsed as "In other words." This was sub optimal as it forced me to google it myself. Hopefully this post will provide utility to future readers.