Banal translation:

The implied argument is that there aren't any values at all that most people will agree on, because one imagined and not-evolutionarily-viable Clippy doesn't think anything other than paperclips have value.

No, that is not the argument implied when making references to paperclipping. That is a silly argument that is about a whole different problem to paperclipping. It is ironic that your straw man claim is, in fact, the straw man.

But it would seem our disagreement if far more fundamental than what a particular metaphor means:

one imagined and not-evolutionarily-viable Clippy

1. Being "Evolutionarily-viable" is a relatively poor form of optimisation. It is completely the wrong evaluation of competitiveness to make and also carries the insidious assumption that competing is something that an agent should do as more than a short term instrumental objective.
2. Clippy is competitively viable. If you think that a Paperclip Maximizer isn't a viable competitive force then you do not understand what a Paperclip Maximizer is. It maximizes paperclips. It doesn't @#%$ around making paperclips while everyone else is making Battle Cruisers and nanobots. It kills everyone, burns the cosmic commons to whatever extent necessary to eliminate any potential threat and then it goes about turning whatever is left into paperclips.
3. The whole problem with Paperclip Maximisers is that they ARE competitively viable. That is the mistake in the design. A mandate to produce a desirable resource (stationary) will produce approximately the same behavior as a mandate to optimise survival, dominance and power right up until the point where it doesn't need to any more.